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INTRODUCTION
In today's society, where individualism and personal liberties
and freedoms are dominant cultural themes, the concepts of pri-
vacy and the "right to be let alone" play an integral role in citi-
zens' day-to-day lives. With increasing frequency, individuals and
public action groups are turning to the court system to protect
the right of personal autonomy. Yet, contrary to public belief,
there is no explicit right of privacy in the federal constitution.
Although the United States Supreme Court has found an implicit
right of privacy in certain contexts, this right has not been inter-
preted as broadly as many would like. As a result, some states
have included explicit privacy provisions within their state consti-
tutions in an effort to extend greater privacy protection to their
citizens than is afforded under the Federal Constitution. In
1980, the citizens of Florida approved an amendment to Flor-
ida's Constitution, which grants Florida citizens an explicit right
of privacy. But do Florida citizens have more privacy protection
than citizens in states that do not have this explicit right? Over
the last twenty years, several individuals and groups have relied
on Florida's privacy provision to protect themselves from alleged
governmental intrusions into their private lives. This article will
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examine some of these challenges and evaluate how the Florida
Supreme Court has interpreted the specific privacy right found
in the Florida Constitution. This article will then attempt to
answer whether Floridians do in fact enjoy more privacy protec-
tion as a result of the enactment of Florida's privacy clause.
I. ORIGINS OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In 1880, Thomas M. Cooley coined the phrase "the right to
be let alone" in his treatise on the law of torts.1 This concept was
expanded upon by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in an
1890 Harvard Law Review article, wherein the two suggested a
"right of privacy."2 Their article was in response to numerous
attacks by the press on Warren's family.' This first notion of pri-
vacy later developed into the tort cause of action for invasion of
privacy,4 which is defined as "an unjustified exploitation of one's
personality or intrusion into one's personal activity."' Years later,
in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,6 Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure con-
ditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect .... They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
7
ThusJustice Brandeis laid the foundation for the development of
the right of privacy that Americans enjoy today. Over the last
half-century, this right has grown to encompass more than one's
interest in preventing public disclosure of personal matters. Due
in part to the willingness of the judicial branch to recognize and
expand individual rights and liberties, the American citizen has
come to expect the right to act and make decisions free from
outside influence.
1. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 29 (lst ed. 1880); see also Hon-
orable Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in
the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection From Private
and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 31 (1997) (discussing the
history of the privacy clause).
2. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Ruv.
193 (1890); see also Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 31.
3. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 31.
4. See id.
5. BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 829 (7th ed. 1999).
6. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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A. The Federal Constitution
It is not clear whether the founders of this country consid-
ered the concept of a right of privacy. While such a right may
have been considered, it was not explicitly adopted by the foun-
ders, as there is no mention of the right of privacy in our federal
constitution.8 The closest the Federal Constitution comes to
explicitly protecting privacy rights is in the Fourth Amendment,
which states "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses: papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated."' However, the protection
offered by the Fourth Amendment generally has not extended
beyond the restriction on improper governmental intrusion.
It was not until 1965, in the seminal opinion of Griswold v.
Connecticut,10 that the United States Supreme Court recognized
an implicit right of privacy in the Constitution.1" In Griswold, the
Court held that a married couple has the right to use contracep-
tive devices, despite a state law which prohibited the use of birth
control.1 2 In an opinion authored by Justice Douglas, the Court
stated:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quar-
tering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
8. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. In Roe, the Court observed that as early as 1891, in the case of Union
Pacific R.R Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), "the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. Other cases
also helped lay the groundwork for the right of decisional autonomy. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a statute requir-
ing all students to attend public schools rather than private schools); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a law which prohibited schools
from teaching subjects in languages other than English). However, Griswold is
generally recognized as the first case to clearly articulate that the Constitution
contains a right of privacy. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NowAK, TREA-
TISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.27 (3d ed.
1999).
12. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating
their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the famil-
iar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "govern-
mental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.13
The Court concluded that the marriage relationship fell within a
"zone of privacy" and therefore held the Connecticut statute to
be unconstitutional.
1 4
Over the next decade, the Court began to extend the "zone
of privacy," both beyond the marital relationship and beyond
the bedroom. In Stanley v. Georgia, 5 the Court held that a state
could not prosecute an individual for possessing obscene mate-
rial in the privacy of his or her home. The decision was based
13. Id. at 484-86 (citations omitted).
14. See id.
15. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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both on the First Amendment freedom of speech and press as
well as the privacy protection announced in Griswold.6 In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,'" the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to persons who were not married.
The Court reasoned:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to mar-
ried persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution
to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is
true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple
is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a sepa-
rate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
But it was not until Roe v. Wade'9 that the Court set out clear
parameters for the "zones of privacy" concept announced in Gris-
wold. In Roe, a pregnant woman brought an action challenging
the Texas abortion statutes, which prohibited abortion at any
stage of the pregnancy except to save the life of the mother.2 ° In
a majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court in Roe
held that a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy with an abortion was protected by the constitutional right
of privacy. Contrary to Griswold, the Court concluded that the
right of privacy was founded in "the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action."'"
The Court stated that "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy."22 The Court
continued by listing five examples of personal rights: marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rear-
ing and education.23 Although the Court found that the right of
privacy encompasses a woman's right to have an abortion, the
Court explained that this right was not absolute, and that the
right must be weighed against important government interests in
16. See id. at 564.
17. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See id. at 117-20.
21. Id. at 153.
22. Id. at 152.
23. See id. at 152-53.
20001
950 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
regulation. Because the right was "fundamental," the Court
stated that a "regulation limiting [this] right[ ] may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest"' and that "legislative enact-
ments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interest at stake. 24 After applying this test to the Texas
abortion statutes, the Court concluded that the statutes were
unconstitutional.25
The test established in Roe is the current test used by the
Court in analyzing privacy clause claims under the Federal Con-
stitution. First, the right of privacy only extends to fundamental
rights such as marriage and procreation. If a party can establish
that a fundamental right exists, then a state can only interfere
with that right if the state's interests are compelling and the
means employed are the least intrusive.
While there have been attempts during the twenty-five years
since Roe to extend the right of privacy beyond the specific cir-
cumstances recited in that opinion, the Court has been hesitant
to do so. For example, the Court has refused to extend the pri-
vacy umbrella to cover an individual's right to either engage in
homosexual activity, 26 or limit the state from collecting their per-
sonal data. 27 However, some of these attempts have been suc-
cessful. For instance, a plurality of the Court hinted that minors
were entitled to privacy rights28 and therefore a statute prohibit-
ing the sale of contraceptives to minors was invalid.29
B. The Right of Privacy in State Constitutions
Although the Supreme Court in Griswold found that the Fed-
eral Constitution only contained an implicit right of privacy, the
Court stated two years later in Katz v. United States,3° that the
states, and not the federal government, are "the final guarantors
of personal privacy:" 31 "But the protection of a person's general
right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is,
like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely
to the law of the individual States.
32
24. Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
25. See id. at 164.
26. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
27. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
28. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
29. For a complete discussion of United States Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with the right of privacy, see ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 11, §§ 18.26-30.
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (interpreting Katz).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
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Accordingly, some states followed suit and began to add
explicit privacy clauses to their own state constitutions. Gener-
ally, this occurred between 1968 and 1980, the period when the
Supreme Court was setting the boundaries for the federal right
of privacy.33 Today, Alaska, 4 California,35 Florida,36 Hawaii,
and Montana 8 have explicit privacy clauses in their state consti-
tutions. In addition, Arizona, ° Illinois,4 ° Louisiana,41 South Car-
olina,4 2 and Washington4 3 have a right of privacy within their
constitutional provisions concerning search and seizure.
Subsequent to Griswold, many privacy right advocates were
hopeful that the Supreme Court would be willing to interpret the
privacy clause of the Federal Constitution broadly, which poten-
tially would result in greater protection of individual rights and
33. See Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illi-
nois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 226 (1989). Silverstein points out that Washing-
ton (1889) and Arizona (1910) are exceptions. See id. n.106.
34. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed." ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (adopted by amendment in 1972).
35. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happi-
ness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (as reworded by constitutional
amendment in 1974).
36. "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from gov-
ernmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided
herein." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (adopted by amendment in 1980).
37. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature
shall take affirmative steps to implement this right." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6
(adopted by amendment in 1978).
38. "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (constitution ratified in 1972).
39. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law." ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8 (constitution
adopted in 1910).
40. "The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions
of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or
other means ... ." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (constitution adopted in 1970).
41. "Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communica-
tion, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy ...." LA. CONsT. art. I, § 5 (constitution adopted in 1974).
42. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable inva-
sions of privacy shall not be violated ...." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (adopted by
amendment 1971).
43. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (constitution
adopted in 1889).
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prevent governmental intrusion in such areas as gambling, drug
use, and other victimless crimes.44 However, these hopes were
thwarted as a result of the restrictions placed on the right of pri-
vacy by the Roe court, which limited privacy protection to funda-
mental rights. Yet, as Justice William Brennan advised, "the
decisions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be,
dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counter-
part provisions of state law."4" Therefore, many individuals
sought privacy protection in state courts. States were able to
offer greater protection than federal courts due to the principle
that "[i] n any given state, the federal Constitution [ ] represents
the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling."46
Thus, an individual state can choose to grant its citizens more
rights under its state constitution than are provided under the
Federal Constitution.47  When a party is unsuccessful in
obtaining privacy protection in federal court under the Federal
Constitution, that party can seek relief in state court and attempt
to persuade the court that the state right of privacy is greater
than the federal right. Justice Brennan labeled this movement
toward state courts "the most important development in constitu-
tional jurisprudence of our times."48
C. Florida's Right of Privacy
As in other states, an effort was made in Florida in the late
1970s to add an explicit right of privacy to Florida's Constitution.
44. See Silverstein, supra note 33, at 223-24.
45. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977). Justice Brennan further stated:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protec-
tions often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought
federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent
protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our
liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Id. at 491.
46. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992) (citing Stewart G.
Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L.
REv. 707, 709 (1983)).
47. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("Our
reasoning... does not exproprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise
its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.").
48. Special Supplement, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 29, 1986, at S1 ("Rediscovery by
state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by
their state constitutions .. . is probably the most important development in
constitutional jurisprudence of our times."); see also Silverstein, supra note 33, at
215 & n.2.
RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE?
At the opening of the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission,
then Chief Justice Ben F. Overton suggested that the Commis-
sion consider the adoption of a privacy clause.49 The Commis-
sion subsequently approved a proposed privacy provision and it
was placed on the ballot to be voted on by the citizens of Flor-
ida.5" However, the measure was defeated by the people.5"
Two years later, the Florida Supreme Court issued its opin-
ion in Shevin v. Harless, Schagger, Reid & Associates,52 wherein the
court concluded that the Florida Constitution did not guarantee
an individual's right of privacy. As a result, efforts were renewed
to amend Florida's Constitution to include an explicit privacy
clause. The same year the Shevin case was decided, the Legisla-
ture again passed a joint resolution to place a privacy amend-
ment on the general election ballot.55 The original version of
the 1980 House proposal stated in relevant part that " [e]very nat-
ural person has the right to be let alone and free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into his private life."5 4 After the
word "unwarranted" was removed from the proposal, the bill was
passed by the House and moved to the Senate.55 Again, in the
Senate, an attempt was made to qualify the scope of the proposal
by limiting the privacy right to "unreasonable governmental
intrusions."56 After further debates, this attempt to qualify the
bill's protection was also defeated, and the final version of the
bill stated: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be
construed to limit the public's right of access to public records
and meetings as provided by law."5" Upon being approved by
both houses, the bill was placed on the ballot and passed by the
voters.58
The legislative debate over article I, section 23 would prove
to be insightful in later years when the Florida Supreme Court
interpreted the reach of the protection provided under Florida's
49. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 34.
50. See id. at 34-35.
51. See id. at 35.
52. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
53. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 35.
54. Jon Mills, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Testing: What Are Your Rights to Privacy in
Florida?, 48 FLA. L. Rv. 813, 826 (1996).
55. See id. at 826-27.
56. Id. at 827.
57. Id. at 828-29; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
58. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 35.
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privacy right.59 Five years after the privacy clause was adopted,
the Florida Supreme Court stated:
The citizens of Florida opted for more protection from
governmental intrusion when they approved article I, sec-
tion 23, of the Florida Constitution. This amendment is an
independent, freestanding constitutional provision which
declares the fundamental right to privacy. Article I, sec-
tion 23, was intentionally phrased in strong terms. The
drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the words
"unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase "gov-
ernmental intrusion" in order to make the privacy right as
strong as possible. Since the people of this state exercised
their prerogative and enacted an amendment to the Flor-
ida Constitution which expressly and succinctly provides
for a strong right of privacy not found in the United States
Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is
much broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.
60
Subsequently, the court has consistently held that article I, sec-
tion 23 was adopted in an effort to grant Floridians greater pri-
vacy protection than that available under the federal
constitution.61
D. Three Categories of Cases Interpreting Florida's Right of Privacy
Since the inception of article I, section 23, the Florida
Supreme Court has reviewed numerous cases in which the right
of privacy was implicated. Those cases can be divided into three
categories: (1) a person's interest in being secure from unreason-
able governmental intrusion, (2) a person's interest in protecting
against the disclosure of personal information, and (3) a per-
son's interest in decisional autonomy.62 The Florida Supreme
Court has used different tests for analyzing the three types of
claims.
The first category of privacy right cases involves an individ-
ual's interest in being free from unwarranted searches and
seizures. At the federal level, the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
59. See Mills, supra note 54, at 828-29.
60. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998); In re T.W.,
551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
62. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 32.
RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE?
searches and seizures . "..."63 Article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution contains a similar provision:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of
private communications by any means, shall not be vio-
lated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable
cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the
place or places to be searched, the person or persons,
thing or things to be seized, the communication to be
intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained.
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or
information obtained in violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution.64
This version of article I, section 12 was approved by the citi-
zens of Florida in November of 1982 and became effective Janu-
ary 3, 1983. Prior to that time, there was no specific requirement
that search and seizure law in Florida be construed in conformity
with the Fourth Amendment and the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.6 5 In Bernie v. State,66 the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the provision in the 1983 amendment which
required Florida courts to construe search and seizure cases in
conformity with the United States Supreme Court. Conse-
quently, although Florida courts were previously "free to provide
its citizens with a higher standard of protection from governmen-
tal intrusion than that afforded by the Federal Constitution,"67
this option was eliminated with the passage of the 1983
amendment.
68
Nevertheless, individuals have still attempted to defend state
criminal charges on the basis that a governmental search and
seizure violated the right of privacy found in article I, section 23.
Despite these attempts, the Florida Supreme Court has held that
article I, section 12, and thus the Fourth Amendment as inter-
63. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
64. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
65. See State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 187 n.2 (Fla. 1987).
66. 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988).
67. State v. Lavazzolli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983).
68. See Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 990-91.
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preted by the Supreme Court, still controls these types of cases.69
The court justified this by the fact that article I, section 23 was
adopted prior to the amendment to article I, section 12.70 As a
result, the Florida Constitution does not offer greater privacy
protection in these types of cases.
The second category of privacy right cases involves situations
where an individual is attempting to shield information from the
public. In most instances, the Florida Supreme Court has relied
on article I, section 23 when analyzing cases from this category.
The Florida Supreme Court articulated the test for deciding
claims under article I, section 23 in Winfield v. Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering.71 In that case, the Florida Department of Busi-
ness Regulation and the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering issued
subpoenas duces tecum to several banking institutions to obtain
banking records of the accounts of Nigel and Malcolm Win-
field.7 2 The Winfields asserted that such action violated their
state constitutional right to privacy.7" Writing for the majority,
Justice Adkins established the standard of review for privacy right
cases. First, an individual must demonstrate that a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists.7" If this burden can be satisfied,
then the burden shifts to the state.7 5 The court concluded that
the right of privacy is a fundamental right, and therefore
demands the compelling state interest standard.76 That is, the
state must prove that the challenged state action serves a compel-
ling state interest. 77 In addition, the state can only accomplish
this goal through the least intrusive means.78 The court rea-
soned that "the state's interest in conducting effective investiga-
tions in the pari-mutuel industry is a compelling state interest
and that the least intrusive means was employed to achieve that
interest" and therefore held that the government's action was
permissible. 79 The Winfield test has been repeatedly cited by the
Florida Supreme Court as the test for deciding claims brought
pursuant to article I, section 23.80
69. See Hume, 512 So. 2d at 188.
70. See id.
71. 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
72. See id. at 546.
73. See id.





79. Id. at 548.
80. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
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Despite the heavy burden that the state must meet in order
to justify an intrusion, the Florida Supreme Court has been reluc-
tant to provide protection for cases involving the disclosure of
personal information."1 One obstacle has been Florida's policy
on public records and its "law in the sunshine" statutes.82 In fact,
article I, section 23 specifically provides, "This section shall not
be construed to limit the public's right of access to public
records and meetings as provided by law." 3 Even in cases where
the public records law was not applicable, the Florida Supreme
Court has still been hesitant to find that a party has met the first
prong of the Winfield test. For example, in City of Miami v.
Kurtz,8 4 the court held that ajob applicant did not have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy regarding whether or not she was a
smoker. Also, in Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Applicant, 5 the
court concluded that the state has a compelling interest in
requesting applicants of the state bar to reveal psychiatric treat-
ment history. Moreover, in some instances, the court has refused
to apply the Winfield/strict scrutiny test. In Rasmussen v. South
Florida Blood Service, Inc., 6 a case involving a victim who con-
tracted AIDS as a result of a blood transfusion, the court relied
on a balancing test to find that the privacy interests of blood
donors as well as society's interest in maintaining a blood dona-
tion system outweighed a victim's interest in disclosure.
In the coming years, a strong possibility exists that many
more claims will arise out of this second category of cases. As the
Information Age progresses and the Internet community grows,
personal data is becoming easier to obtain. 7 The notion of the
so-called "private life" is becoming extinct and aspects of peo-
ple's lives that were once off-limits are now apparently fair game.
Phone numbers, addresses, and other background information
81. See Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 39. Of the 11 informational
privacy claims considered by Florida appellate courts between 1989 and 1998,
only four decisions resulted in privacy protection. In comparison, of the 18
behavioral privacy claims considered by Florida appellate courts in the same
span, 10 decisions resulted in privacy protection. See Daniel R. Gordon, Upside
Down Intentions: Weakening the State Constitutional Right to Privacy, a Florida Story of
Intrigue and a Lack of Historical Integrity, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 579, 595-96 (1998).
82. See F.A. SLAT. ANN. ch. 119 (West 1996) (public records law).
83. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
84. 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995).
85. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
86. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
87. See Gordon, supra note 81, at 588 (Florida Supreme Court Justice
Overton asked, "who, ten years ago, really understood that personal and finan-
cial data on a substantial part of our population could be collected by govern-
ment or business and held for easy distribution by computer operations?")
(citing CONST. REviSION COMM'N 3267, 3271 (Jan. 9, 1997)).
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are increasingly being accessed and shared between companies
or other organizations. 8 Undoubtedly, individuals in the next
millennium are sure to encounter increasing difficulty in shield-
ing personal information from others in the public arena.
Finally, this article will focus on the third category of privacy
right cases-cases involving a person's interest in decisional
autonomy. In this category of cases, a conflict exists between an
individual's right to make his or her own decisions concerning
personal conduct and the state's interest in regulating such con-
duct. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 9 the United States Supreme
Court characterized this third category as involving an individ-
ual's "intimate personal choices" concerning "the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of
the mystery of human life."9°
As pointed out earlier in this article, over the last thirty
years, individuals both in Florida and nationwide have been seek-
ing privacy protection for a wide range of personal decisions,
including whether to terminate a pregnancy, whether to refuse
medical treatment, and whether to permit a third party to have
contact with one's children. As in the second category of cases,
the Florida Supreme Court has applied the Winfield/strict scru-
tiny test to personal autonomy cases.91 Since 1980, the bulk of
the privacy right cases considered by the Florida appellate courts
have come from this third category of cases.92 The next section
of this article will analyze some of these cases and explain their
results.
II. GREATER PRIVACY PROTECTION IN FLORIDA?
As indicated above, article I, section 23 was adopted with the
intention of giving Florida citizens greater privacy protection
than that afforded by the Federal Constitution. Over the last
twenty years, several individuals and groups have tested this
notion by challenging particular state action or conduct as being
in violation of article I, section 23. Many of these challenges
have culminated at the Florida Supreme Court, leaving the task
88. See Silverstein, supra note 33, at 225 ("Commentators recount the
threats to personal privacy posed by computers, data banks, and government
agencies' thirst for information.").
89. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
90. Id. at 851.
91. See infra Pt. II and discussion of cases therein.
92. Of the 29 privacy right cases that Florida appellate courts considered
between 1989 and 1998, 18 involved issues relating to behavioral privacy (cases
regarding an individual's personal decisions). See Gordon, supra note 81, at
595.
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of setting the parameters of Florida's right of privacy to the judi-
cial branch. So do Florida citizens enjoy greater privacy protec-
tion as a result of article I, section 23? This article will examine
four different scenarios where the Florida Supreme Court was
asked to interpret Florida's right of privacy. The disputes all
stem from the third category of privacy right cases-those cases
involving an individual's right to make personal decisions free
from state interference. In two of the scenarios, the Florida
Supreme Court recognized greater privacy protection for Floridi-
ans as a result of article I, section 23. In contrast, in the other
two cases, the Florida Supreme Court refused to grant protection
under the state right of privacy.
A. Two Examples Where Floridians Enjoy Greater Privacy Protection
1. Parental Consent or Notification Requirements For
Abortion
Probably no other privacy right issue has created more con-
troversy in American society during the last three decades than
the issue of a woman's right to choose whether to continue her
pregnancy. As is often the case with controversial social topics,
this issue has also been prevalent in American jurisprudence.
Most notable is the United States Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Roe v. Wade, the principal case in United States abor-
tion law.
In Roe, the Supreme Court established that a woman's right
to choose to have an abortion was part of the constitutional right
of privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.9" As Justice
Blackmun wrote in the majority opinion, the right of privacy "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy."94 After establishing this fundamen-
tal constitutional principle, the majority in Roe ruled that state
regulation of abortion practices could be upheld only if they
were narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.95 The
Roe Court recognized two state interests which might support
some limitations on the right to an abortion-the interest in pro-
tecting the health of the mother and the life of the fetus.9 6
Therefore, there exists a "compelling interest" in the mother's
life where restriction on the right to an abortion is needed to
protect her life or safety. Likewise, there is a "compelling inter-
93. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 156.
96. See id. at 163.
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est" in the fetus when the state can show a viable life which it has
an interest to protect.
The Roe majority has often been portrayed as establishing a
rigid "trimester" analysis in determining what types of govern-
ment regulations of abortion would pass constitutional muster.
However, this rigid "trimester" analysis seems to have been aban-
doned by the Supreme Court within a few years of the Roe deci-
sion. By the 1980s, the Court appears to have adopted a
reasonableness test to determine the constitutionality of abortion
regulations. 7 Under this test, the Court will uphold a regulation
if it appears that it is a reasonable means of protecting the
woman's life; however, the Court will invalidate any such regula-
tion if the Court finds the law was intended not to protect the
health of the woman, but merely to deter abortions.98 In Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services,99 while they did not do so in a
majority opinion, it appears that a majority of the justices
rejected the trimester analysis. Although a new test has never
been formally adopted by the Court, it seems that the post-Roe
cases stand for the following principle for analyzing abortion
regulations:
The Supreme Court will only uphold abortion regulations
that are supported by a compelling state interest; that
states have compelling interests in protecting the health of
the woman and protecting a viable fetus. A state regula-
tion of an abortion that is to be performed prior to the
time the fetus is viable must be judicially determined to be
narrowly tailored to protect the health of the woman. A
state law that is designed to protect a viable fetus will be
upheld if it is narrowly tailored to the promotion of that
interest. A law designed to protect a possible viable fetus
must allow an exception for a woman who needs an abor-
tion to protect her life or health. Some special restrictions
will be upheld on abortions for minors, due to the societal
state interest in the protection of minors. A state may
refuse to fund abortions, because the right to privacy
includes only a right to choose to have an abortion without
governmental interference and not a right to have abor-
tion services provided by the government. 100
A regulation that states have attempted to impose in recent
years is parent notification or consent requirements for minors
97. See ROTUNDA & Now~a, supra note 11, at 589-90.
98. See id. at 590.
99. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
100. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 11, at 590-91.
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seeking an abortion. The Supreme Court first confronted paren-
tal consent requirements in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth.1 In this case, the Court considered a statute which
gave a minor female's parent absolute veto power over her deci-
sion to have an abortion. Writing for the majority, Justice Black-
mun found the absolute veto power unconstitutional because
"any independent interest the parents [might] have in the termi-
nation of the minor daughter's pregnancy [was] no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant. '12 However, the majority did
concede that the state had a greater interest in regulating abor-
tion procedures for juveniles than it had when it regulated abor-
tions for adults.103 Justices Stewart and Powell, who joined the
majority opinion, wrote separately to indicate that the constitu-
tional flaw in the statute was the absolute veto given to the
minor's parents. As Justice Stewart stated in his concurring
opinion:
I think it clear that [the parental consent requirement's]
primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of
an absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an
abortion. The Court's opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird sug-
gests that a materially different constitutional issue would
be presented under a provision requiring parental consent
or consultation in most cases but providing for prompt (i)
judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent
and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the
minor is mature enough to give an informed consent with-
out parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is
in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not
impose parental approval as an absolute condition upon
the minor's fight but would assure in most instances con-
sultation between the parent and child.1"4
In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I),105 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a state parental consent statute was ambiguous as to
both the authority of parents to veto their minor child's decision
to have an abortion, as well as the availability of a judicial bypass
procedure, and therefore, the Court remanded the case to the
lower courts.106 The Supreme Court considered the statute
101. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
102. Id. at 75.
103. Id. at 72.
104. Id. at 90-91 (citation & footnote omitted).
105. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
106. See id.
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again in Bellotti v. Baird, (Bellotti i/).107 The statute at issue in
Bellotti II required a minor to receive the consent of her parents
or, alternatively, receive judicial approval for an abortion in a
proceeding in which a court determined whether the abortion
was in the best interest of the minor. 10 8 However, the statute
made no provision for a determination of whether the minor was
sufficiently mature to make an informed decision regarding
abortion; consequently, without a majority opinion, the Supreme
Court invalidated the statute.10 9 Justice Powell's plurality opin-
ion observed that the state could restrict a minor's ability to have
an abortion by requiring notification or consent from a parent if
the state established a procedure whereby the female could
bypass the consent or notification requirement.1 The Powell
plurality opinion also recognized three reasons for concluding
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature man-
ner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.
'' 11
In addition, the Powell plurality opinion crafted guidelines
for a judicial bypass procedure that would promote these inter-
ests. Addressing these guidelines, the Powell plurality stated:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough
informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation
with her physician independently of her parent's wishes; or
(2) that even if she is not able to make this decision inde-
pendently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests.' 
1 2
In Bellotti II, the state law failed to meet these guidelines because
it did not require the judge to determine whether the minor was
sufficiently mature to make her own decision, nor did it require
the judge to honor her decision if she were. It has become clear
that, even absent a majority opinion, the Powell plurality in Bel-
lotti Ihas become the de facto constitutional standard for paren-
tal consent and notification laws.
The year 1983 marked the first time in which the Court
upheld a parental consent requirement. In Planned Parenthood
107. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Justice Powell's plurality opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
111. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
112. Id. at 643-44.
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Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcrofi,' t1 the Court
upheld a state law requiring a minor to receive the consent of
one of her parents or, alternatively, to obtain consent from the
juvenile courtjudge. While Justice Powell only wrote for himself
and Chief Justice Burger in Ashcroft, the standards he promul-
gated in that opinion, which echoed those he articulated in Bel-
lotti II, would provide the guidelines in future opinions for
determining which types of parental consent or notification
requirements would be upheld by the Court.1 14 Justice Powell
found that the interests in the protection of minors and the pro-
motion of family decision making justified a parental consent
statute.1 15 However, he indicated that the statute must contain a
judicial bypass procedure which (1) allows the minor to bypass
the consent or notification requirement through a process that
does not unduly burden her ability to have a safe abortion; (2)
allows the minor to receive permission for the abortion if (a) the
minor demonstrates sufficient maturity to make her own deci-
sion, or (b) the trial judge finds the abortion is in the minor's
best interest; and (3) protects the anonymity of the minor. 1 6
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health'1 7 upheld a parental notification
statute which required one parent, or in certain circumstances
another relative, to be notified. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, explained the criteria for a constitutional bypass proce-
dure and found that the state "may require a heightened stan-
dard of proof"' when, as here, the bypass procedure
contemplates an ex parte proceeding at which no one opposes
the minor's testimony.""' 9 Thus, it is clear that under federal
law, a state may require the consent of, or notification to, one or
113. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
114. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 11, at 633. See also Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
115. See Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 502.
116. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 & n.16.
117. See Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 502 (upholding statute which required
doctor to give notice to one parent, or in certain circumstances to a relative of
the minor before performing abortion, but allowed for doctor and the minor to
avoid requirement through judicial bypass procedure); see also Hodgson v. Min-
nesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating statute that required notification of
both minor's parents).
118. "Clear and convincing" evidence that the minor is mature enough
or the abortion is in her best interest.
119. Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 502. The majority also found that the minor
was given a fair hearing, even though she did not have state funded counsel and
was required to make a showing of maturity by "clear and convincing" evidence.
See id. at 516.
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both of a minor's parents if a judicial bypass procedure that
meets the requirements of Akron is provided. 2 °
Against this federal backdrop, several states have attempted
to implement parental consent or notification laws. While sev-
eral have succeeded, a few, including Florida, have failed. The
distinguishing factor between Florida and states that have suc-
cessfully enacted notification requirements appears to be Flor-
ida's privacy amendment.
In 1989, in In re T. W.,2 the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered section 390.001 (4) (a) of the Florida Statutes,' 2 2 Florida's
parental consent statute. This statute required that, prior to hav-
ing an abortion, a minor must obtain parental consent, or alter-
natively, convince a court that (1) she is sufficiently mature to
make the decision or (2) the abortion is in her best interest.
23
120. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 11, at 639.
121. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. §390.001(4) (a) (Supp. 1988), provided:
1. If the pregnant woman is under 18 years of age and unmarried, in
addition to her written request, the physician shall obtain the written
informed consent of a parent, custodian, or legal guardian of such
unmarried minor, or the physician may rely on an order of the circuit
court, on petition of the pregnant unmarried minor or another per-
son on her behalf, authorizing, for good cause shown, such termina-
tion of pregnancy without the written consent of her parent,
custodian, or legal guardian. The cause may be based on: a showing
that the minor is sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to
the procedure; the fact that a parent, custodian, or legal guardian
unreasonably withheld consent; the minor's fear of physical or emo-
tional abuse if her parent, custodian, or legal guardian were requested
to consent; or any other good cause shown. At its discretion, the court
may enter its order ex parte. If the court determines that the minor is
sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to the procedure, the
court shall issue an order authorizing the procedure without the con-
sent of her parent, custodian, or legal guardian. If the court deter-
mines that the minor is not sufficiently mature, the court shall
determine the best interest of the minor and enter its order in accord-
ance with such determination.
2. The court shall ensure that a minor who files a petition pursuant
to this paragraph will remain anonymous. The minor may participate
in proceedings in the court on her own or through another person on
her behalf. Court proceedings brought pursuant to this paragraph are
confidential and shall be given the priority necessary for the court to
reach a decision promptly. The court shall rule within 48 hours after
the petition is filed; but the 48-hour limitation may be extended at the
request of the minor. An expedited anonymous appeal shall be made
available to a minor who files a petition pursuant to this paragraph.
3. The Supreme Court may promulgate any rules it considers neces-
sary to ensure that proceedings brought pursuant to this paragraph
are handled expeditiously and are kept confidential.
123. See T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1188-89.
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Pursuant to this procedure, T.W., a pregnant, unmarried minor,
petitioned for waiver of parental consent under the judicial
bypass provision and argued on alternative grounds that: (1) she
was sufficiently mature to give informed consent to the abortion;
(2) if she was required to obtain consent from her parents, she
had a justified fear of physical or emotional abuse from them;
and (3) because her mother was seriously ill, informing her of
the pregnancy would be an added burden.
1 24
In addition to T.W.'s claim, the guardian ad litem argued
that the judicial bypass provision of the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague and that, therefore, parental consent must be
required when a minor seeks an abortion. 125 The trial court
agreed and found the judicial bypass procedure to be unconstitu-
tional on the basis that it (1) lacked a sufficient provision for
challenges to its validity, (2) was vague, and (3) did not provide
for testimony to controvert the minor's testimony.
126
On appeal, the district court ruled the judicial bypass provi-
sion was unconstitutionally vague in that it permitted arbitrary
denial of a petition. The district court also identified several
other defects in the statute, claiming that it (1) failed to provide
for a record hearing, (2) lacked guidelines as to admissible evi-
dence, (3) merely provided for a brief forty-eight-hour time limit,
and (4) failed to provide for appointed counsel for indigent
minors. 127 Subsequent to the district court's ruling and prior to
the Florida Supreme Court's granting certiorari, T.W. lawfully
ended her pregnancy, thus making the issues raised moot.
1 2
However, the Florida Supreme Court found that the questions
presented were of great public importance and were likely to
recur; therefore, they accepted the case pursuant to its review
powers under article V, section 3(b) (1) of the Florida
Constitution.
Justice Shaw, writing for the majority, acknowledged the fed-
eral law in this area and explained that the statute must pass mus-
ter under both the federal and state constitutions. 129 Noting
Florida's unique express privacy provision, the court chose first
to examine the statute under the Florida Constitution, since a
finding that it was invalid under the Florida Constitution would





129. See id. at 1190.
20001
966 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
eliminate the need for any further review under the Federal
Constitution.
130
The T. W. court analyzed the history of Florida's right of pri-
vacy and explained that the privacy clause is evidence of a clear
intent on the part of Florida's citizenry to provide more protec-
tion from governmental intrusion into one's private life than that
provided by the federal constitution. Therefore, because T.W.
claimed relief pursuant to article I, section 23, the Court relied
on the strict scrutiny test announced in Winfield. In applying this
test, the court indicated that it had to first determine whether a
fundamental right is implicated in a woman's decision to have an
abortion. 31 The Court concluded that "[t]he Florida Constitu-
tion embodies the principle that "[f] ew decisions are more per-
sonal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision ...
whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that
choice freely is fundamental."
32
Based on the amendment's clear language that the right of
privacy extends to "every natural person," the Court further
observed that this right clearly extends to minors.133 However,
the Court recognized that minors' rights are not absolute and
that the state can overcome these constitutional rights by demon-
strating that the statute furthers a compelling state interest
through the use of the least intrusive means.'
Noting the state interests acknowledged by the Roe Court-
the health of the mother and the potentiality of life in the
fetus-the T. W court considered the question of when these
interests become compelling under Florida law. The court
adopted the end of the first trimester as the time when the state's
interest in maternal health becomes compelling.135 The court
stated that prior to this point no interest in maternal health
could be served by significantly restricting how abortions can be
performed by qualified doctors, while after this point the matter
becomes one of genuine concern.' 36 Therefore, "prior to the
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to
the woman and may not be significantly restricted by the
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
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state." 37 After this point, however, the state may impose signifi-
cant restrictions only if done through the use of the least intru-
sive means "designed to safeguard the health of the mother."' "
In regard to the state's interest in the health of the unborn
child, the court concluded that under Florida law this interest
becomes compelling upon "viability," since at this point "society
becomes capable of sustaining the fetus," and its interest in pre-
serving its potential for life thus becomes compelling.1"' The
court indicated that this point typically occurs upon completion
of the second trimester.
140
In conclusion, the court held that the statute failed with
respect to these state interests because "it intruded upon the pri-
vacy of the pregnant minor from conception to birth ... [and]
[s]uch a substantial invasion of a pregnant female's privacy by
the state for the full term of the pregnancy is not necessary for
the preservation of maternal health or the potentiality of life." 14 '
The court acknowledged, however, that where parental rights
over a minor are concerned, it needs to address additional state
interests.1 4 2 The court cited Bellotti II to detail the interests
involved when a minor seeks an abortion: "[t] he peculiar vulner-
ability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing." '43 But, the court explained, while the fed-
eral courts applied a relaxed standard in assessing the validity of
parental consent statutes,14 4 Florida's explicit privacy provision
requires that the compelling state interest standard be applied:
"We agree that the state's interests in protecting minors and in
preserving family unity are worthy objectives. Unlike the federal
Constitution, however, which allows intrusion based on a 'signifi-
137. Id.
138. Id. The court also noted that insignificant burdens during either
stage need only further important state interests. See id.
139. Id.; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting).
140. See T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979)).
144. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 414, 427
n.10 (1983) ("[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that, in view of the
unique status of children under the law, the States have a 'significant' interest in
certain abortion regulations aimed at protecting children 'that is not present in
the case of an adult.'") (emphasis added); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 441
n.32 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Although it may seem that the minor's
privacy right is somehow less fundamental because it may be overcome by a
'significant state interest,' the more sensible view is that state interests inapplica-
ble to adults may justify burdening the minor's right.") (emphasis added).
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cant' state interest, the Florida Constitution requires a 'compel-
ling' state interest in all cases where the right to privacy is
implicated."
145
Because Florida had not recognized these interests as being
sufficiently compelling to justify parental consent for other pro-
cedures involving minors, 146 the court was unable to find a com-
pelling state interest to justify a parental consent requirement
only where abortion is concerned: "Although the state does have
an interest in protecting minors, 'the selective approach
employed by the legislature evidences the limited nature of the
* . . interest being furthered by these provisions.' 
147
The court further noted that the statute also failed the sec-
ond prong of the Winfield standard as it did not employ the least
intrusive means in furthering the state interest.1 4 8 The court
explained that an "inquiry under this prong must consider pro-
cedural safeguards relative to the intrusion," '49 and pointed out
that the judicial bypass provision neither provided legal repre-
sentation for the minor nor required a record of the hearing.1 5 °
The court found that "[i]n proceedings wherein a minor can be
wholly deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to
privacy, counsel is required under our state constitution." 51
Additionally, the court pointed out that the statute failed to pro-
vide for a record hearing, stating that "[w]ithout a record hear-
ing to memorialize a trial judge's reasons for denying a petition
for waiver of parental consent, appellate review is meaning-
145. T. W, 551 So. 2d at 1195 (citing Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel,
477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065 (1987) (allowing an unwed minor to
consent, without parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her
pregnancy or her existing child, except abortion, regardless of the possible con-
sequences involved); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63 (1987) (permitting minor to put
child up for adoption without parental consent).
147. T.W, 551 So. 2d at 1195 (quoting Ivey v. Bacardi Imports Co., 541
So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1989)).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 1196.
150. See id.
151. Id. See also Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson,
716 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that requiring an indigent minor
to handle her case all alone is to risk deterring many minors from pursuing
their rights because they are unable to understand how to navigate the compli-
cated court system on their own or because they are too intimidated by the
seeming complexity to try); In re D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980) (recog-
nizing that individual's interest in preserving the family unit and raising chil-
dren is fundamental; therefore, counsel for the affected party is constitutionally
required in any proceeding involving permanent termination of fundamental
rights).
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less." '5 2 Finally, the Court pointed to the fact that the statute
failed to make any exception for "emergency or therapeutic"
abortions as another reason to conclude that the statute failed to
provide adequate procedural safeguards and, therefore, did not
employ the least intrusive means.
153
Thus, it is apparent that in the area of abortion regulation,
Florida's privacy amendment provides greater privacy protection
for Florida citizens than does the Federal Constitution; but, how
does Florida compare with other states that have constitutions
which implicitly, as opposed to explicitly, provide for a right of
privacy? Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice' provides a good
comparison.
Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
T.W, the Supreme Court of Mississippi examined a similar
parental consent statute in Fordice. The statute at issue in Fordice
required minors, with limited exceptions, to obtain consent of
both parents prior to having an abortion.1 5 5 After failing facial
constitutional challenges in federal courts, a coalition of pro-
choice advocates challenged this statute, as well as other abortion
152. T.W, 551 So. 2d at 1196.
153. Id.
154. 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998).
155. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to 63 (1993). Subject to significant
exceptions, Mississippi requires an unemancipated minor to obtain consent of
both parents or the approval of the court before obtaining an abortion; in
instances where the minor's parents are divorced, unmarried, or separated,
then consent of the parent with primary custody of the minor is sufficient. See
§ 41-41-53(2) (a). If the minor's parents are married, but one of the parents is
not available within a reasonable time and manner, then written consent of the
available parent is sufficient. See § 41-41-53(2) (b). If the pregnancy is the result
of sexual intercourse between the minor and her natural father, adoptive
father, or stepfather, then written consent of the minor's mother is sufficient.
See § 41-41-53(2) (c). Abortions without written parental consent are permitted
in cases of medical emergency. See § 4141-57. The parental consent statutes
allow for ajudicial bypass through which the court may waive parental consent.
See § 41-41-53(3). The minor may represent herself, but the court shall advise
her of her right to counsel if she is not already represented. See § 41-41-55(2).
The proceeding must be confidential and anonymous, and criminal penalties
exist to prevent disclosure of the proceedings. See §§ 4141-55(3), 41-41-61.
The chancery court must rule upon the application for waiver within 72 hours,
or the parental consent requirement is waived. See § 41-41-55(3). Parental con-
sent is waived if the court finds (1) the minor is sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision on her own, or (2) obtaining the abortion would be in the
best interests of the minor. See § 41-41-55(4). The minor has the right to an
expedited, confidential, and anonymous appeal if the court denies the waiver.
See § 4141-55(6). No filing fee is required under the statute. See § 41-41-55(7).
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provisions within the act, 56 claiming that these provisions vio-
lated the Mississippi Constitution.
The Mississippi Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether the Mississippi Constitution provides for a right to an
abortion. As the court pointed out, the Federal Constitution's
failure to state an explicit right to an abortion did not prevent
the United States Supreme Court from finding certain "penum-
bras" from which a protection of privacy is derived.'57 Likewise,
the Mississippi court acknowledged that in In re Brown,"'8 they
had previously held that while the state constitution does not
explicitly deny or grant the right to an abortion, the constitution
does provide for a right to privacy and the right to make choices
concerning one's body.159 Therefore, since "autonomous bodily
integrity is protected under the right of privacy," then
"[p] rotected within the right of autonomous bodily integrity is
an implicit right to have an abortion."16 ° Therefore, the court
156. The parties also challenged the constitutionality of§ 4141-31 (1993)
(requiring a 24-hour waiting period after state mandated consultation on infor-
mation pertaining to abortion and pregnancy before a woman may have an
abortion); and Rules and Regulations for the Operation of Ambulatory Surgical
Facilities and Abortion Facilities § 102.19 (requiring a physician to have com-
pleted an American Medical Association approved residency in obstetrics and
gynecology before performing abortions at a licensed abortion clinic). For pur-
poses of this article, only the Mississippi Supreme Court's analysis of the paren-
tal consent statute will be analyzed.
157. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 653.
158. 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
159. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 653. The court notes that article 3, section
32 of the Mississippi Constitution states that "[t] he enumeration of rights in this
constitution shall not be construed to deny and impair others retained by, and
inherent in, the people." Id. As the court explains, this language mirrors the
Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution and, therefore, should be
interpreted similarly.
160. Id. (emphasis added); see also American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (holding that state constitution protects
right of woman to choose to have an abortion); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,
1190-93 (Fla. 1989) (right to an abortion included under explicit state constitu-
tional right to privacy); Mahaffey v. Attorney General, No. 94-406793 AZ, 1994
WL 394970, at *7 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 15, 1994) (stating that "State Constitution
encompasses a right of privacy, which in turn includes the right to an abor-
tion"); Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 26-27 (Minn. 1995) (finding right to
abortion is included in right to autonomous bodily integrity protected under
state constitutional right to privacy); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.
1976) (likening the right to refuse medical treatment to the right to an abor-
tion); Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 186 (N.Y. 1994) (holding right to pri-
vacy protected under due process clause of New York Constitution involves
right to reproductive choice, including right to an abortion); State v. Koome,
530 P.2d 260, 263 (Wash. 1975) (holding that state constitution protects right
to an abortion under right to privacy).
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concluded that "U]ust as the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the federal constitutional right to privacy pro-
tects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, we find that
the state constitutional right to privacy includes an implied right
to choose whether or not to have an abortion."161
Next, consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning
in T. W, the Fordice court acknowledged that minors, like adults,
possess constitutional rights, and that included within these
rights is the right to an abortion.1 62 However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court cautioned that these rights are not absolute as
minors are not afforded constitutional protection equal to that of
adults.163 As in T.W, the court relied upon the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti II to support its conclusion
that minors' rights are not equal to those of adults.
1 64
The Fordice court next discussed which standard it should
apply to this constitutional challenge. The Plaintiffs argued that
T.W and American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (Lungren I)65
demonstrate that a strict standard of review is required,166 and
while the court noted that it has previously required a compel-
ling state interest standard when assessing governmental intru-
sion into one's personal life,1 67 it chose not to do so in this
case.' 6 8 Because the Mississippi Supreme Court rarely addressed
the issue of the appropriate standard for reviewing the constitu-
tionality of an abortion statute, it called upon United States
Supreme Court precedent for guidance-in particular Casey v.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania.1
69
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court balanced a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability with
the state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the
161. Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 653-54.
162. See id. at 658.
163. See id.
164. See id. (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (finding that
constitutional rights of children are not equal with those of adults because of
"the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing")).
165. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
166. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 658.
167. See Mississippi Empl. Sec. Comm'n v. McGlothin, 556 So. 2d 324
(Miss. 1990) (applying compelling state interest test); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d
1033, 1039 (Miss. 1985) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under which the
right to privacy may only be infringed upon in compelling cases of great and
imminent public danger).
168. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 654.
169. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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potentiality of life," 17° and concluded that "only where state regu-
lation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."17 t. Based upon the
reasoning in Casey, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded
that the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of bal-
ancing the state's interest with the woman's constitutionally pro-
tected liberty:
We find this reasoning to be sound. While we have previ-
ously analyzed cases involving the state constitutional right
to privacy under a strict scrutiny standard requiring the
State to prove a compelling interest, we are not bound to
apply that standard in all privacy cases. The abortion issue
is much more complex than most cases involving privacy
rights. We are placed in the precarious position of both
protecting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
before viability and protecting unborn life. In an attempt
to create a workable framework out of these diametrically
opposed positions, we adopt the well reasoned decision in
Casey, applying the undue burden standard to analyze laws
restricting abortion. We do not limit any future applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny standard for evaluating infringe-
ment on a person's right to privacy in other areas.
1 72
The court acknowledged that this standard is less stringent
than that employed by other states deciding this issue,' and dif-
ferentiated those decisions by the fact that those states' constitu-
tions provide for an explicit right to privacy, while the Mississippi
Constitution has only an inferred right to privacy.' 7 4
Thus, having applied this less stringent standard, the court
held that the parent consent statute was not too restrictive:
The State has a legitimate interest in protecting the health
of its minors, and in ensuring that their decisions regard-
ing abortion are well informed and carefully considered.
These interests are promulgated by Mississippi's parental
consent statutes. Mandatory parental consent does not
place an undue burden upon a minor's right to obtain an
170. Id. at 871 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
171. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
172. Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 655.
173. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (Lungren III), 940
P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (applying the compelling state interest test, the court
found that California's parental consent law significantly intruded upon funda-
mental autonomy interest protected by California's explicit privacy clause); In re
T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
174. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 654.
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abortion, particularly in light of the judicial bypass. Those
minors who lack the requisite maturity to make the long-
impacting decision to have an abortion need their parents'
guidance, and those who are able to make a fully informed
choice alone have the option of obtaining a waiver of
parental consent through the judicial bypass proceed-
ing.'
75
The court, therefore, determined that the parental consent stat-
ute passed the undue burden test, and was thus constitutional.
176
Thus, a comparison of the Florida and Mississippi Supreme
Courts' opinions demonstrates that in the area of abortion rights
the explicit right to privacy in Florida's constitution provides
greater privacy protection for its citizens than those states with
no, or merely an implicit, right to privacy.
2. Grandparental Visitation
The issue of grandparental visitation rights also has become
a controversial topic in recent years. At common law, there was
no right to grandparental visitation if the parents of the child
objected to the visitation. 1 7 7 Today, however, statutes in all fifty
states provide for grandparental visitation in some form.
1 78
175. Id. at 660.
176. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the proce-
dural safeguards employed in the statute helped to ensure that the statute did
not constitute an undue burden. See id.
177. See Theresa H. Sykora, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Are the Best Inter-
ests of the Grandparent Being Met Before Those of the Child?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 753, 758
(1996) (citing Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Iowa 1984)).
178. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150 (Michie 1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (West Supp.
1994); ARF. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3102 (West
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59
(West 1995) (general visitation statute-prior to 1983, the statute specifically
provided for grandparental visitation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (Michie
Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01; Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1994);
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.39 (Michie Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 32-719
(1995); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/607 (West Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-
11.7-2 (Michie Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Banks-Baldwin
1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1003 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 9-102 (1995); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (1994); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b
(West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-
3 (Law. Co-op. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452/402 (West Supp. 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 125A.330 (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992);
N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2
(Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 72 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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Although there are a number of variations of the issue, essen-
tially the conflict develops when one or both of a child's parents
refuse to allow one or more of the grandparents to have contact
with the child. The state becomes involved when the grandpar-
ent files a petition in court in an attempt to acquire court-
ordered visitation. Florida section 752.01 of the Florida Statutes,
which permits grandparental visitation, is the vehicle for state
action:
(1) The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent
of a minor child, award reasonable rights of visitation to
the grandparent with respect to the child when it is in the
best interest of the minor child if:
(a) One or both parents of the child are deceased;
(b) The marriage of the parents of the child has been
dissolved;
(c) A parent of the child has deserted the child;
(d) The minor child was born out of wedlock and not
later determined to be a child born within wedlock as
provided in s. 742.091; or
(e) The minor is living with both natural parents who
are still married to each other whether or not there is
a broken relationship between either or both parents
of the minor child and the grandparents, and either
or both parents have used their parental authority to
prohibit a relationship between the minor child and
the grandparents.
(2) In determining the best interest of the minor child,
the court shall consider:
(a) The willingness of the grandparent or grandpar-
ents to encourage a close relationship between the
child and the parent or parents.
(b) The length and quality of the prior relationship
between the child and the grandparent or
grandparents.
§ 50-13.2 (Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.051 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.123 (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311 (West 1991);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-24.1 (Michie Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33)
(Law Co-op 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 24-5-54 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-6-302 (1998); TEX. FA. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1012 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie 1999) (general statute regarding visitation);
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.240 (1999); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-4 (Supp. 1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West 1991); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1994).
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(c) The preference of the child if the child is deter-
mined to be of sufficient maturity to express a
preference.
(d) The mental and physical health of the child.
(e) The mental and physical health of the grandpar-
ent or grandparents.
(f) Such other factors as are necessary in the particu-
lar circumstances.
179
Over the past decade, this statute has been challenged as
being in violation of a parent's right of privacy. The United
States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case out of
the state of Washington.1 8 ° The issue before the Supreme Court
is whether the Washington grandparent visitation statute violates
a parent's right of privacy under the Federal Constitution.'
8
However, a number of states have already ruled on the issue, with
varying results.
The first grandparental visitation case considered by the
Florida Supreme Court was Beagle v. Beagle." '82 In Beagle, Roy and
Sharron Beagle filed a petition in the trial court for visitation
rights with their granddaughter, Amber Beagle. 8 The child's
parents, Dewey and Melissa Beagle, challenged the petition and
moved to dismiss the action. 184 At the time of the proceeding,
the Beagles were "living together with the child as an intact
family."
18 5
The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that Florida's
grandparental visitation statute violated the parents' right of pri-
vacy under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.' 6 On
appeal, the district court reversed, relying on its previous deci-
sion in Sketo v. Brown.'8 7 In Sketo, the district court upheld the
award of grandparental visitation in a case where one of the par-
ents was deceased.' 8 8 Building on its reasoning in Sketo, the dis-
trict court in Beagle stated:
When we consider that the justification for Florida's grand-
parent visitation statute is the best interest of the child, it
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (1999).
180. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 11 (1999). At the time this article
was written, the Court had not yet rendered an opinion in TroxeL
181. See Custody of Smith v. Stillwell, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998).
182. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
183. See id. at 1273.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1273-74.
187. 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
188. See id. at 382.
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seems to us that it matters little whether the child whose
interest is to be protected lives in a loving, nurturing home
with both parents, a loving home headed by a working
mother whose erstwhile husband has deserted the family
or with a loving father devastated by a divorce not of his
asking. Article I, Section 23 protects the privacy rights of
each of these family units in precisely the same way. None
of these loving parents is more or less equal than any other
and none is entitled to more or less privacy protection
than are the others. None of the children whose best inter-
est is protected by section 752.01 is the child of a lesser
parent because he or she belongs to the family unit
defined by a loving father and mother or father or
mother.
189
Recognizing the importance of this issue, the district court
certified the following question as being one of great public
importance: "Is section 752.01(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993),
facially unconstitutional because it constitutes impermissible
state interference with parental rights protected by either article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution or the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion?"'19 The supreme court accepted the case pursuant to its
discretionary review powers.
In a unanimous opinion written by justice Overton, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court struck down the provision of the statute that
was in question. The court began its analysis by recounting the
history of the grandparental visitation statute. The concept of
grandparental visitation was first introduced by the Florida Legis-
lature in 1978.191 In 1984, the Legislature amended the grand-
parental visitation statute and permitted court-ordered visitation in
the following situations: (1) where one or both of the parents of
the child are deceased; (2) where the marriage of the child's par-
ents has been dissolved; or (3) where a parent of the child has
deserted the child.1 9 2 The Legislature again amended the statute
in 1990 to require grandparental visitation when it is in the best
interest of the child.'9 3 Finally, in 1993, the Legislature added
subsection (1) (e) to section 752.01, which opened the door for
189. Beagle v. Beagle, 654 So. 2d 1260, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
190. Id.
191. Beagle, 678 So. 2d.at 1272-73; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (b)
(Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.08 (Supp. 1978).
192. See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (Supp.
1984) (providing that the court may order visitation).
193. See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273; see also § 752.01 (providing that the
court shall order visitation when in the best interest of the child).
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grandparental visitation in situations where the child was still liv-
ing with both natural parents who were still married to each
other." 4 This final amendment was the provision that was chal-
lenged in Beagle.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the issue of
whether the state can interfere with family relationships impli-
cates a parent's right of privacy."9 Therefore, the court applied
the strict scrutiny test announced in Winfield.19 6 The court deter-
mined that the state did not have a compelling interest in impos-
ing grandparental visitation rights over the objection of at least
one of the parents. 97 In making this determination, the court
looked at other cases involving parental privacy rights. The court
observed that the statute in In re T. W. that required parental con-
sent prior to an abortion did not satisfy the compelling state
interest.1 98 On the other hand, the court cited its previous deci-
sions in Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services199
and Schmitt v. State,2 °° wherein the court recognized that the state
has a compelling state interest, when it is acting to prevent
demonstrable harm to a child. In Padgett, the court concluded
that the state had a compelling interest in terminating parental
rights based on evidence of abuse or neglect.20 1 In Schmitt, the
court found that the state had a compelling interest in protecting
a child from sexual exploitation by a parent.
20 2
Based on this precedent, the court in Beagle held that "the
State may not intrude upon the parents' fundamental right to
raise their children except in cases where the child is threatened
with harm."203 The court. seemed to dismiss the "best interest of
the child" standard contained within the statute:
However, even assuming grandparent visitation promotes
the health and welfare of the child, the state may only
impose that visitation over the parents' objections on a
showing that failing to do so would be harmful to the child.
It is irrelevant, to this constitutional analysis, that it might
194. See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273; see also § 752.01 (1) (e) (authorizing the
award of grandparental visitation rights in situations where the child lives within
an intact family).
195. See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1275-76.
196. See id. at 1276.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
200. 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991).
201. See Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
202. See Schmitt, 590 So. 2d at 410-11.
203. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1276.
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in many instances be "better" or "desirable" for a child to
maintain contact with a grandparent.
2 4
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court held that section
752.01 (1) (e) was unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted
grandparental visitation without an explicit finding of harm to
the child. The court limited its holding to situations where the
state has attempted to impose grandparental visitation upon "an
intact family."20 5 The court closed by stating, "it is not our judi-
cial role to comment on the general wisdom of maintaining
intergenerational relationships. We must refrain from expres-
sing our personal thoughts as either grandparents or future
grandparents. "206
Two years later, the Florida Supreme Court accepted
another case dealing with this issue. In Von Eiff v Azicri,207 the
court was asked whether subsection (1) (a) of section 752.01 vio-
lated a parent's right of privacy under Florida's Constitution.
Subsection (1) (a) required grandparental visitation when it was
in the best interest of the child if one or both parents of the child
were deceased.20 8
Luisa and Philip Von Eiff were married in 1990 and their
daughter Kelly was born in 1991.209 Luisa died of cancer in
1993.210 The following year, Philip remarried, and his new wife
Cheryl adopted Kelly.211 Kelly's maternal grandparents, the
Azicris, filed a petition for visitation in the trial court at the end
of 1994 after the Von Eiffs refused unconditional visitation.2 1 2 In
response, the Von Eiffs argued that subsection (1) (a) violated
their right of privacy.
21 1
The case proceeded to a nonjury trial.214 The testimony
revealed the Azicris were very involved in Kelly's life prior to
Luisa's death.21 5 While the Von Eiffs permitted the Azicris to
visit Kelly after Philip remarried, the Von Eiffs required that a
third person be present during the visits. 2 16 The Azicris
204. Id. at 1276-77 (quoting Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74
(Ga. 1995)).
205. Id. at 1277.
206. Id.
207. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
208. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 752.01 (1) (a) (1993).
209. See Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 511.
210. See id.
211. See id.
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expressed their dissatisfaction with such an arrangement and tes-
tified that visiting the home of their deceased daughter, where
Philip now lived with his new wife, brought back painful memo-
ries.217  At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered
unsupervised visitation, finding that it was in the best interest of
the child to have the relationship with her maternal grandpar-
ents restored. 2 8
On appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's
order.219 The district court found that "the state has a compel-
ling interest in protecting children after a parent has died by pre-
serving grandparent visitation that is in the child's best
interests." 220 The district court also concluded that subsection
(1) (a) is "narrowly tailored" to promote this compelling inter-
est.22 1 The district court distinguished Beagle because the family
in Beagle was intact, whereas the Von Eiffs were no longer intact
as a result of Luisa's death.222 As in Beagle, the district court in
Von Eiff certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court,
which accepted the case.
2 23
Again in a unanimous opinion, this time written by Justice
Pariente, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the challenged
provision as violating the Von Eiffs' right of privacy. 224 The court
applied the compelling state interest test and concluded that the
state failed to satisfy its burden.225 The court stated that subsec-
tion (1) (a) suffers from the same infirmity as subsection (1) (e),
in that it does not require proof of demonstrable harm to the
child. 2 6 The court reasoned that requiring proof of harm to the
child as a prerequisite "ensures that the focus will not be on the
perceived benefits of a grandparent-grandchild relationship
before the need for government intervention is assessed."
227
The Azicris argued that when one or more of a child's par-
ents is killed, the child will suffer harm if the state does not pre-
serve the familial bond between grandparents and
grandchildren.228 The court dismissed this argument, asserting
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 699 So. 2d 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
220. Id. at 773.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 775.
223. See id. at 778.
224. See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 517 (Fla. 1998).
225. See id. at 514.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 515.
228. See id.
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that the death of a child's parent is not the type of harm which
has traditionally warranted government intrusion.2 2 9
The court also addressed the district court's argument that
Beagle was distinguishable because it involved an intact family:
Under Beagle, the State could not force grandparent
visitation against the "express wishes" of Philip Von Eiff
before the death of the biological mother, "in the absence
of demonstrated harm to the child." We find nothing in
the unfortunate circumstance of one biological parent's
death that would affect the surviving parent's right of pri-
vacy in a parenting decision concerning the child's contact
with her maternal grandparents. Philip Von Eiff, whom
the trial court found to be a "loving, nurturing and fit" par-
ent, continues to enjoy a right of privacy in his parenting
decisions, despite the death of the child's biological
mother. As succinctly stated by the Fifth District, under
operatively identical facts in finding subsection (1) (a)
unconstitutional: "We are unable to discern any difference
between the fundamental rights of privacy of a natural par-
ent in an intact family and the fundamental rights of pri-
vacy of a widowed parent."
In addition, Philip Von Eiff has remarried and his new
wife, Cheryl Von Eiff, adopted the child, thereby together
forming a new "intact" family. While our result does not
depend upon this factual scenario, the fact that a new
intact family was formed illustrates the difficulty in
allowing government intervention into family decision-
making based on whether the family is "intact." Moreover,
the adoption of the child by Cheryl Von Eiff creates the
same "relationship . . . for all purposes" between the
adopted child and the adoptive parent "that would have
existed if the adopted [child] were [the adoptive parent's]
blood descendant.
230
Finally, the court again disapproved the "best interest of the
child" standard that is found in section 752.01:
It permits the State to substitute its own views regarding
how a child should be raised for those of the parent. It
involves the judiciary in second-guessing parental deci-
sions. It allows a court to impose "its own notion of the
children's best interests over the shared opinion of these
229. See id.
230. Id. at 515-16 (citations omitted).
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parents, stripping them of their right to control in parent-
ing decisions."
2 3 1
The court closed by stating:
We recognize that it must hurt deeply for the grand-
parents to have lost a daughter and then be denied time
alone with their granddaughter. We are not insensitive to
their plight. However, familial privacy is grounded on the
right of parents to rear their children without unwarranted
governmental interference.
The Von Eiffs possess a constitutional right of privacy
in their decision to limit the grandparents' visitation with
their child. The Von Eiffs are loving, nurturing and fit par-
ents, whose parenting decisions do not constitute a sub-
stantial threat of demonstrable harm to the child's health
or welfare....
There may be many beneficial relationships for a
child, but it is not for the government to decide with whom
the child builds these relationships. This concept impli-
cates the very core of our constitutional freedoms and
embodies the essence of Florida's constitutional right of
privacy.
232
Finally, in Saul v. Brunetti,2 31 the Florida Supreme Court was
again asked to rule on Florida's grandparent visitation statute.
The issue in Saul was whether subsection (1) (d) of section 752.01
violated article I, section 23. Subsection (1) (d) required grand-
parent visitation when it was in the best interest of the child if the
child was born out of wedlock.
23 4
Dominick Brunetti and Beth Saul had an out-of-wedlock
child named Tyler.2 35 Tyler lived with the mother and her par-
ents, David and Diane Saul.23 '6 Nearly two years after the child
was born, the mother was killed in automobile accident.
23 7
Shortly after the mother died, Tyler moved in with his father.
238
The Sauls filed suit seeking visitation pursuant to section
752.01.2 39 Although the father objected, the trial court awarded
the Sauls weekly visits. 24 0 The trial court found that continued
231. Id. at 516 (citation omitted).
232. Id.
233. 25 Fla. L. Weekly. S52 (Fla. Jan. 27, 2000)
234. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1)(d) (1995).
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visitation with the Sauls was in the child's best interest. 241 There
was no evidence in the record that the child would suffer any
harm if visitation were denied.2 4 2
On appeal, the district court declared subsection (1) (d)
unconstitutional. 24" The Florida Supreme Court accepted the
case and affirmed the district court's decision. 24 4 In a per curiam
opinion, the court held that subsection (1) (d) suffers the same
infirmity as the provisions in Beagle and Von Eiff245 The court
stated that "the fact that the parents of the child in Brunetti were
never married should not change this Court's analysis of the con-
stitutionality of the statute. 2 4 6
Pursuant to Beagle, Saul, and Von Eiff, it is clear that article I,
section 23 played a significant role in striking down two provi-
sions of Florida's grandparental visitation statute. But does this
mean that Florida parents have greater privacy rights in this area
of the law than do parents in other states?
Of the state courts that have considered the constitutional
status of grandparent visitation statutes, a majority has upheld
them.2 47  Generally, in those cases in which the statute was
upheld, the particular statute permitted grandparental visitation
when it was in the best interest of the child,24 8 the same standard
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
244. See Saul 25 Fla. L. Weekly at S52.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. See In re Graville, 985 P.2d 604, 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) ("In so
holding, we are in agreement with the majority of the courts in the nation that
have upheld similar grandparent visitation statutes"); Ridenour v. Ridenour,
901 P.2d 770, 774 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("A majority of courts which have con-
sidered this issue have rejected similar or related constitutional challenges.").
Courts in the following states have upheld grandparental visitation statutes in
the face of constitutional challenges: Cockrell v. Sittason, 500 So. 2d 1119, 1121
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Craville, 985 P.2d at 611; Sanchez v. Parker, No. 93-09822,
1995 WL 489146 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 1, 1995); West v. West, 689 N.E.2d 1215,
1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); Spradling v. Harris, 778 P.2d 365, 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); King v.
King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992); Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912, 915 (Miss.
1997); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Roberts v. Ward, 493
A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1994); Ridenour, 901 P.2d at 774; Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d at 1049, 1052
(N.Y. 1981); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14, 18-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988);
Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 516 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986);
Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App. Ct. 1975); Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d
1144 (Wyo. 1995).
248. See Silverstein, supra note 33.
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the Florida Supreme Court disapproved. Many of the courts that
have upheld grandparental visitation statutes have recognized
that the state has an interest, in its capacity as parens patriae, to
promote the best interest of the child.2 49 In King v. King, the
Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned:
In an era in which society has seen a general disintegration
of the family, it is not unreasonable for the General Assem-
bly to attempt to strengthen familial bonds. As this Court
observed . . . "the grandparents' visitation statute was an
appropriate response to the change in the demographics
of domestic relations, mirrored by the dramatic increase in
the divorce rate and in the number of children born to
unmarried parents, and the increasing independence and
alienation within the extended family inherent in a mobile
society." . . . There is no reason that a petty dispute
between a father and son should be allowed to deprive a
grandparent and grandchild of the unique relationship
that ordinarily exists between those individuals. One of
the main purposes of the statute is to prevent a family quar-
rel of little significance to disrupt a relationship which
should be encouraged rather than destroyed.2 5 °
An appellate court in Utah has also stated:
Modern society has witnessed a general trend toward disin-
tegration of the nuclear family. Changes in the
demographics of domestic relations, the rise in the divorce
rate, and the increasing numbers of children born to sin-
gle parents are but a few of the factors contributing to the
destabilization of the traditional nuclear family. Given
such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for our legisla-
ture to attempt to strengthen intergenerational ties as an
alternative or supplementary source of family support for
children.
25 1
Rather than relying on the strict scrutiny test, courts in Ken-
tucky, Missouri, New Jersey, and Utah have relied on the lesser
rational relation test when analyzing grandparental visitation stat-
utes.25 2 Even when strict scrutiny was applied, courts in Indiana
and Wyoming still found that the state's interest in protecting the
child justified an award of visitation if a judge found such an
249. See, e.g., Michael, 900 P.2d at 1150.
250. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632.
251. Campbell 896 P.2d at 643.
252. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 632; Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210; RT., 650
A.2d at 16; Campbell 896 P.2d at 644.
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award to be in the best interest of the child.2" Contrary to Flor-
ida, none of these courts required that demonstrable harm to the
child be established in order for a grandparent to receive an
award of visitation.254
However, Florida is not alone in its stance on grandparental
visitation statutes, as courts in other states have required a show-
ing of demonstrable harm to the child as a prerequisite to grand-
parental visitation.255 In fact, most of these courts have come to
this conclusion despite the fact that the particular state did not
have an explicit right of privacy within its state constitution. For
example, in Hawk v. Hawk,256 the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed an award of grandparental visitation in the absence of a
specific finding of harm to the child. The court based its deci-
sion on the implicit right of privacy found in article I, section 8 of
the Tennessee Constitution.257 In Brooks v. Parkerson258 and In re
Herbst,259 the Georgia and Oklahoma Supreme Courts respec-
tively made similar rulings. Both courts based their decisions not
only on implicit rights of privacy in their state constitutions but
also on the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitu-
tion.26 Finally, in Williams v. Williams,261 the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed an award of grandparental visitation absent a
finding of harm to the child. A plurality of the court based its
decision on the federal right of privacy found in the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than relying on state constitutional
grounds.262 In sum, when compared to other jurisdictions, it is
apparent that parents in Florida have been afforded greater pri-
253. See Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Michael,
900 P.2d at 1147.
254. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Custody of Smith v. Stillwell, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert.
granted, 120 S.Ct. 11 (1999). Although Washington has an explicit right of pri-
vacy within the state constitution's provision concerning search and seizure, the
court in Stillwell seemed to invalidate the challenged grandparental visitation
statute on federal constitutional grounds. See id.
256. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
257. See id. at 579. The Tennessee Constitution provides that "no man
shall . . .deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land." TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
258. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
259. 971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
260. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 771-74; Herbst, 971 P.2d at 399. Article 1,
paragraph 1, section 1 of the Georgia Constitution states that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property expect by due process of the law." The
court in Herbst did not cite to the particular provision of the Oklahoma Consti-
tution where the implicit right of privacy is found.
261. 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998).
262. See id. at 417-18.
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vacy rights then parents in other states when it comes to making
decisions regarding child rearing.
B. Two Examples Where Floridians Were Not Afforded Greater
Privacy Protection
1. Physician-Assisted Suicide
Next, consider the issue of physician-assisted suicide. Ninth
Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt has expressed that the contro-
versy regarding assisted suicide "may touch more people more
profoundly than any other issue the courts will face in the fore-
seeable future."2 6 3 The issue presents an interesting struggle
between the traditional taboo against suicide and state-sanc-
tioned murder on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
recognition that some diseases are so debilitating that although a
person may still be alive in a medical sense, for all intents and
purposes, the quality of life has been severely diminished. The
recent medical breakthroughs of the past half-century have
allowed doctors to prolong a patient's life through the use of res-
pirators, life-support machines, and other similar instruments.
Therefore, proponents of assisted suicide argue that death with
dignity is the next logical step; that is, medicine and science
should intervene and end a terminally ill patient's life when such
a procedure is requested by the patient.
Assisted suicide has been a judicial "hot topic" over the past
decade, in part due to the efforts of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. In 1990,
Dr. Kevorkian assisted Janet Adkins in committing suicide near
Grovelands, Michigan.264 Adkins was suffering from the early
stages of Alzheimer's disease.265 Although Dr. Kevorkian was ini-
tially charged with murder, the charge was later dismissed.266
Before 1999, Dr. Kevorkian had a handful of similar charges
brought against him, all resulting in dismissals or acquittals.267
The number of assisted deaths attributed to Dr. Kevorkian
ranges from forty-five to seventy. 268 Recently, however, Dr.
Kevorkian was found guilty in a Michigan court of second-degree
263. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir.
1996).
264. See Scott A. Fisk, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and




267. See Key Dates in Kevorkians Crusade, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 27,
1999, <http://www.freep.com/news/extra2/qkchron27.htm>:
268. See Fisk, supra note 264, at 304 n.18.
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murder for the death of Thomas Youlk.269 Prior to his death,
Youlk suffered from Lou Gehrig's disease.27 ° In September of
1998, Dr. Kevorkian assisted Youlk in taking his life, and later
that year, 60 Minutes aired a portion of the suicide procedure as
part of a Mike Wallace interview with Dr. Kevorkian.271 In March
of 1999, Kevorkian was found guilty by a jury,272 and later sen-
tenced to ten to twenty-five years in prison.273 An appeal of the
case is still pending.
274
As a result of the nationwide attention that individuals such
as Dr. Kevorkian have received, assisted suicide has often been
the subject of many legislative debates and courtroom battles.
Several efforts have been made to legalize assisted suicide. Some
groups have attempted to legalize such conduct through state
legislative bills or state constitutional amendments. Although
many of these efforts have failed,275 the citizens of Oregon have
twice approved the "Death With Dignity Act," which legalizes
assisted suicide.
276
Other groups have sought protection of the right of assisted
suicide from the judicial branch. In 1990, the United States
Supreme Court decided Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
277Health, a case concerning whether a patient has a fundamental
right to refuse medical care. The case involved a woman who was
severely injured in a car accident. As a result of her injuries, the
woman ended up in a vegetative condition.278 The woman's par-
269. See Brian Murphy, Kevorkian Backs Off His Threat to Starve, DETROIT
FREE PREss, Apr. 16, 1999, <http://www.freep.com/news/extra2/qkevol6x.
htn>.
270. See Dawson Bell, Kevorkian Seeks New Trial on Appeal, Nov. 16, 1999
<http://www.freep.com/news/extra2/kevo16_19991116.htm>.
271. See Murphy, supra note 269.
272. See Kevorkian Found Guilty, K-NEWS, Mar. 26, 1999, <http://www.
channel6000.com/knews/news/national/newsnat-990326-163024.html>.
273. See Murphy, supra note 269.
274. See Bell, supra note 270.
275. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 717-18 (1997), the
Supreme Court stated that with the exception of Oregon, "many proposals to
legalize assisted-suicide have been and continue to be introduced in the States'
legislatures, but none has been enacted." Id. at 718 n.15 (referring to numer-
ous failed proposals to legalize assisted suicide). The Court did note that
although many other countries have rejected proposals to legalize assisted sui-
cide, Columbia's Constitutional Court has legalized voluntary euthanasia for
terminally ill patients. See id. at 718 n.16 (citing to Sentencia No. C-239/97
(Corte Constitucional, Mayo 20, 1997); Colombia's Top Court Legalizes Euthanasia,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 22, 1997 at A18).
276. SeeJohn A. Brennan, A State Based Right to Physician Assisted Suicide, 79
B.U. L. REv. 231, 241-42 (1999).
277. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
278. See id. at 266.
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ents requested the hospital to remove the life-sustaining
machines.279 The Missouri Supreme Court held that state law
required the hospital to continue the treatment unless (1) a com-
petent patient chooses to discontinue treatment or (2) the
guardian of an incompetent patient could establish by "clear and
convincing evidence" that the incompetent patient would have
rejected the treatment. 280 The Missouri Supreme Court found
that the woman's parents failed to meet this second prong.28'
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the Federal Constitution did not forbid the state of Missouri
from requiring "clear and convincing evidence" of the incompe-
tent patient's wishes prior to removing the machines.2 82 How-
ever, the case was very important, because although the Court
did not explicitly hold that such a right exists, the Court did state
that "for the purposes of this case, we assume the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
2 81
Many supporters of assisted suicide looked to Cruzan as the
springboard to a federal constitutional right to die.
But in 1997, in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg,84 the
United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the right
to privacy protected assisted suicide. In Washington, the Court
upheld a Washington statute that prohibited assisted suicide.285
The Respondents, who consisted of Washington physicians and
terminally ill patients, asserted that assisted suicide was protected
by the principle of "self-sovereignty" and therefore sheltered by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 286 The Court, however, concluded
that the right of assisted suicide was not a fundamental right.
28 7
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court began its analysis by looking at the legal history of the ban
on suicide and assisted suicide. The Court stated that "for over
700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has pun-
ished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisted sui-
cide." 288 Suicide was punished as a crime at English common
279. See id. at 267.
280. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Mo. 1988).
281. See id. at 426.
282. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81
(1990).
283. Id. at 279.
284. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
285. See id. at 735.
286. See id. at 708.
287. See id. at 728.
288. Id. at 711.
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law, and Sir William Blackstone, author of the Commentaries on
the Laws of England, described suicide as "self-murder" and
stated that the law ranked suicide among the highest crimes.28 9
Suicide continued to be looked down upon by the American col-
onies, although some of the harsh sanctions that were previously
required at common-law were abolished, such as forfeiture of all
remaining items in the estate. In the nineteenth century,
many states began to enact statutes prohibiting assisted suicide,
the earliest being New York in 1828, and by the time the Four
teenth Amendment was ratified, most states outlawed assisted
suicide.2 9 '
After looking at the history of suicide, the Court then pro-
ceeded to distinguish its earlier decision in Cruzan. The Court
stated:
The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply
deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy.
Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a
battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the deci-
sion to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assump-
tion was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and
constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide
with the assistance of another may be just as personal and
profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.
Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as
quite distinct. In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most
States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do
today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be somehow
transmuted into a right to assistance in committing
suicide.
29 2
Thus, after concluding that the right to die was not "funda-
mental," the Court examined Washington's law using the
rational basis test and found that the law was rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest. 293 The Court found that
Washington had a legitimate interest in: (1) preserving human
life; (2) preventing suicide as a public health concern; (3) pre-
cluding under-diagnosis of pain and suffering; (4) protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession; (5) protecting dis-
289. Id. at 712 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAES 189).
290. See id. at 713-14.
291. See id. at 715.
292. Id. at 725-26 (citations omitted).
293. See id. at 728.
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abled and terminally ill patients from prejudice, abuse, neglect,
and mistakes; and (6) avoiding the slippery slope to voluntary
and perhaps involuntary euthanasia.294 Therefore, the Washing-
ton law was upheld.
The same day Glucksberg was decided, the Court issued its
opinion in Vacco v. Quill,295 another case involving assisted sui-
cide. The case involved a challenge to a group of New York laws
which permitted patients to refuse medical treatment but prohibited
physicians from assisting in suicide. 296 Again, in an opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the assisted sui-
cide law and rejected the argument that New York law violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
29 7
The Respondents in Vacco consisted of New York doctors
who sued the state's Attorney General. The doctors argued, and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, that "New
York law does not treat equally all competent persons who are in
the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths,"
because "those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on
life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by
directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining
equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering
prescribed drugs."
298
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the New
York assisted suicide laws "neither infringe fundamental rights
nor involve suspect classifications. 1299 As a result, the Court
stated that the laws will be upheld if they "bear[ ] a rational rela-
tion to some legitimate end." °° The Court concluded:
On their faces, neither New York's ban on assisting suicide
nor its statutes permitting patients to refuse medical treat-
ment treat anyone differently than anyone else or draw any
distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless of physi-
cal condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a
suicide. Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly
to all "unquestionably comply" with the Equal Protection
Clause. °1
294. See id. at 728-33.
295. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
296. See id. at 797.
297. See id. at 808.
298. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
299. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 799.
300. Id.
301. Id at 800 (citations omitted).
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Finally, as it did in Glucksberg, the Court distinguished assist-
ing suicide from withdrawing medical treatment.30 2 After exam-
ining the same state interests that were discussed in Glucksberg,
the Court held that New York's laws were rationally related to a
legitimate end, and therefore the assisted suicide ban was not
unconstitutional. 3
302. See id. at 800-08. The Court stated:
[W]e think the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and
endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both
important and logical; it is certainly rational. The distinction com-
ports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. First,
when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from
an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.
Furthermore, a physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal
to begin, life-sustaining medical treatment purposefully intends, or
may so intend, only to respect his patient's wishes and "to cease doing
useless and futile or degrading things to the patient when [the
patient] no longer stands to benefit from them." The same is true
when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in some cases,
painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the physician's pur-
pose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain. A doctor
who assists a suicide, however, "must, necessarily and indubitably,
intend primarily that the patient be made dead." Similarly, a patient
who commits suicide with a doctor's aid necessarily has the specific
intent to end his or her own life, while a patient who refuses or discon-
tinues treatment might not.
The law has long used actors' intent or purpose to distinguish
between two acts that may have the same result. Put differently, the
law distinguishes actions taken "because of" a given end from actions
taken "in spite of" their unintended but foreseen consequences.
... [New York] has neither endorsed a general right to "hasten
death" nor approved physician-assisted suicide. Quite the opposite:
The State has reaffirmed the line between "killing" and "letting die."
' * ' Cruzan therefore provides no support for the notion that
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is "nothing more nor less
than suicide."
For all these reasons, we disagree with respondents' claim that the
distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted
suicide is "arbitrary" and "irrational." Granted, in some cases, the line
between the two may not be clear, but certainty is not required, even
were it possible. Logic and contemporary practice support New York's
judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore,
consistent with the Constitution, treat them differently. By permitting
everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment while prohibiting any-
one from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstanding and
rational distinction.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
303. See id. at 808.
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Pursuant to Glucksberg and Vacco, it was apparent that the
proponents of assisted suicide would not find any protection in
the Federal Constitution. This caused some groups to turn their
efforts toward state courts. In California, however, this effort
failed.
In Donaldson v. Lungren,3 °4 a California Court of Appeal con-
sidered whether the California Constitution protected a patient's
right to assisted suicide. Donaldson, a terminally ill patient,
argued that there is no difference between a doctor who discon-
nects a life-support machine or fails to provide treatment and a
doctor who assists a patient in committing suicide.30 5 Donaldson
argued that in both situations, the doctor is actively participating
in the patient's life, because "[n]ot doing anything is doing
something."30 6 The California appellate court rejected this argu-
ment, pointing out that the doctor who sustains a patient's life by
the use of a life-support machine essentially postpones an imme-
diate encounter with death, whereas the doctor that assists sui-
cide hastens death.30 7 The court did recognize that Donaldson
had the right to take his own life, stating that "[n] o state interest
is compromised by allowing Donaldson to experience a dignified
death rather than an excruciatingly painful life."30 ' But the
court concluded that Donaldson's state right of privacy did not
protect the right to assisted suicide.30 9 Four years later, in Kevor-
kian v. Arnett,3 1° a federal district court also concluded that the
right of privacy in California's constitution did not protect the
right to assisted suicide. 11
Against this backdrop, the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Florida Constitution's right of privacy pro-
tected the right to assisted suicide in the 1997 case of Krischer v.
McIver. 12 Charles E. Hall, a thirty-five-year-old man suffering
from AIDS, sought permission in a Florida trial court for his doc-
tor, Cecil McIver, M.D., to assist in his death.1 3 Hall contracted
AIDS from a blood transfusion.314 Hall claimed that section
304. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).




309. See id. at 63-64.
310. 939 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
311. See id. at 732.
312. 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
313. See id. at 99.
314. See id.
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782.08, which prohibited assisted suicide, violated his right of pri-
vacy under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.315
At the time of the case, Hall's health was deteriorating and it
was apparent that he was suffering."1 6 After finding that Hall was
mentally competent, the trial court enjoined the state attorney
from enforcing section 782.08 against Dr. McIver should he assist
Hall in committing suicide.317 The trial court also established
guidelines for the procedure. The court held that "the lethal
medication must be self-administered only after consultation and
determination by both physician and patient that Mr. Hall is (1)
competent, (2) imminently dying, and (3) prepared to die." 18
The trial court held that the second and third factors are to be
subjectively determined by Hall, and that Dr. McIver must con-
clude that Hall's belief is "objectively reasonable at the time. "319
The state attorney appealed the trial court's ruling and the dis-
trict court certified the question to the Florida Supreme
Court. 320 The supreme court accepted the case.
In his brief to the supreme court, McIver relied on previous
cases of the Florida Supreme Court recognizing a patient's right
to refuse medical treatment. The first right to refuse treatment
case considered by the court was the 1980 case of Satz v. Perlmut-
ter,32 1 a case that arose before article I, section 23 was in effect.
Apparently relying on the Federal Constitution's right of privacy,
the Florida Supreme Court adopted the decision of the district
court, which granted a terminally-ill patient the right to discon-
tinue the use of an artificial respirator.3 22 The district court
stated that the right of an individual to refuse treatment should
be balanced against the state's interest in (1) the preservation of
life, (2) the protection of innocent third parties, (3) the preven-
tion of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity
of medical practice.3 23 The district court concluded that none of
the four state interests surmounted the individual's right to die.
Nine years later, in Public Health Trust v. Wons, 324 the Florida
Supreme Court expanded on its decision in Perlmutter and held




318. Id. at 100.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 99-100.
321. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
322. See id. at 360.
323. See State v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
324. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
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The following year, in In re Guardianship of Browning,'25 the court
specifically determined that the right of privacy found in article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution protects a person's right
to refuse medical treatment. The court stated, "[E]veryone has a
fundamental right to the sole control of his or her person. "
' 26
Finally, in In re Dubreuil, 1 7 the supreme court again held, as
it did in Wons, that an individual has a state constitutional right
to refuse a blood transfusion. Patricia Dubreuil was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy and admitted to a hospital for the
delivery of the baby.3 21 Shortly thereafter, it became apparent
that a Caesarean section delivery was necessary. 29 Patricia
signed a routine consent form for the procedure but withheld
consent for a blood transfusion on the basis of beliefs as a Jeho-
vah's Witness. After the delivery, it became apparent that a
blood transfusion was required to save Patricia's life.33 1 When
Patricia continued to refuse the blood transfusion, hospital
authorities were able to contact Luc Dubreuil, Patricia's
estranged husband. 2 Luc gave his consent for the transfu-
sion. 3 3 After the initial transfusion, the physicians believed that
additional transfusions would be needed and the hospital peti-
tioned the court for an emergency declaratory judgement to
determine the hospital's duty.334 The trial court ruled in favor of
the hospital, thereby allowing the hospital to administer further
blood transfusions.335 The trial court tried to distinguish Perlmut-
ter, a case involving an adult patient with no minor dependents,
by pointing out that Patricia Dubreuil was the mother of four
minor children and no alternative method of care had been
established for the four children. 336 The trial court found that
the state's compelling interest under the second prong of the
Perlmutter test-the protection of innocent third parties-out-
325. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
326. Id. at 10. The court reiterated its previous statement in In re T.W.,
wherein the court stated, "We can conceive of few more personal or private
decisions concerning one's body that one can make in the course of a life-
time ... [than] the decision of the terminally ill in their choice of whether to
discontinue necessary medical treatment." Id. (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
327. 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
328. See id. at 820
329. See id.
330. See id.
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weighed the mother's right to refuse the transfusion. 7 The dis-
trict court of appeal affirmed the trial court's order.
33 8
Patricia Dubreuil was subsequently released from the hospi-
tal. 33' Although the case was moot, the Florida Supreme Court
accepted the case because the issue was capable of repetition.34 °
In quashing the district court's decision, the supreme court
pointed out that the children's father was still alive, and although
he was separated from his wife, he would become the natural
guardian under Florida law if the mother should die.34 1 The
court concluded that the state failed to introduce any evidence
that the father would not assume responsibility for the children,
and therefore held that the state's interest did not outweigh the
mother's right to refuse the transfusion.342 The court left open
the question as to whether the state's interest in protecting inno-
cent third parties could ever outweigh an individual's interest in
refusing treatment.
343
In Krischer, McIver argued to the Florida Supreme Court that
there was no meaningful distinction between refusing medical
treatment and assisting suicide. 44 However, in an opinion
authored by Justice Grimes, the Supreme Court rejected this
conclusion.
The court began its analysis by pointing out that although
there is no state law criminalizing suicide, Florida has punished
assisted suicide since 1868." 4' In fact, as of 1994, thirty-four juris-
dictions nationwide had statutes which criminalized such con-
duct.346 The court also considered several reports from various
agencies and groups that opposed physician-assisted suicide.
347
The court then proceeded to conduct the traditional Win-
field/strict scrutiny privacy clause analysis. After concluding that
Mr. Hall did have a right of privacy regarding personal medical
decisions, the court analyzed whether the State had a compelling
337. See id.
338. See In re Dubreuil, 603 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
339. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 822.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 821, 827.
342. See id. at 828.
343. See id. at 827.
344. See Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 102 (Fla. 1997).
345. See id. at 100.
346. See id. (citing to People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W. 2d 714 (Mich. 1994)).
In Kevorkian, the Supreme Court of Michigan catalogued the states that specifi-
cally prohibit assisted suicide. See Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 732 n.51.
347. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 101-04 (considering When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context vi-vii (May 1994), (Supp.
Apr. 1997); AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report 1-93-8.
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interest to justify intruding into Mr. Hall's privacy right.348 The
court began by distinguishing its earlier decisions recognizing
the right to refuse medical treatment. The court concluded that
"there is a significant difference" between the right to refuse
medical treatment and the right to physician assisted suicide.349
The court cited to the following reasoning from the American
Medical Association:
When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient
dies primarily because of an underlying disease. The ill-
ness is simply allowed to take its natural course. With
assisted suicide, however, death is hastened by the taking
of a lethal drug or other agent. Although a physician can-
not force a patient to accept a treatment against the
patient's will, even if the treatment is life-sustaining, it does
not follow that a physician ought to provide a lethal agent
to the patient. The inability of physicians to prevent death
does not imply that physicians are free to help cause
death. 5 °
The court went on to analyze whether the state's interests in
preventing assisted suicide outweighed Mclver's right to assisted
suicide. The court used the same four interests relied on by the
court in Perlmutter (1) the preservation of life, (2) the protection
of innocent third parties, (3) the prevention of suicide, and (4)
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of medical practice.3
The court concluded that three of the four interests "are so com-
pelling as to clearly outweigh Mr. Hall's desire for assistance in
committing suicide. 3 52
First, the court found that the state has an unqualified inter-
est in the preservation of life.3 53 In doing so, the court distin-
guished the present case from Perlmutter, where suicide was not at
issue because the discontinuation of life support would "merely
result in [the patient's] death, if at all, from natural causes."
354
The court explained that disconnecting a respirator that would
348. See id. at 102.
349. Id. at 103.
350. Id. at 102-03 (quoting AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Report 1-93-8, at 2).
351. See id. at 103-04.
352. Id. at 103. The court did not address the second interest articulated
in Perlmutter-the protection of innocent third parties. The court stated in a
footnote that there was no evidence introduced to demonstrate the effect of
Mr. Hall's suicide on innocent third parties. See id. at 103 n.4.
353. See id. at 103.
354. Id. (quoting Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978)).
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result in death by natural causes was in contrast to "an unnatural
death by means of a 'death producing agent."' 355 The court held
that the state has a compelling interest in preventing the "affirm-
ative, destructive" act of assisted suicide.356
Second, the court held that the state has a compelling inter-
est in preventing suicide. To support this, the court cited to the
United States Supreme Court's analysis in Glucksberg on this
point:
Those who attempt suicide-terminally ill or not-often
suffer from depression or other mental disorders.
Research indicates, however, that many people who
request physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if
their depression and pain are treated. The New York Task
Force, however, expressed its concern that, because
depression is difficult to diagnose, physicians and medical
professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously
ill patients' needs. Thus, legal physician-assisted suicide
could make it more difficult for the State to protect
depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffer-
ing from untreated pain, from suicidal impulses.
357
Finally, the court held that the state has a compelling state
interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession.
The court stated that numerous medical groups opposed assisted
suicide, including: the American Medical Association, the Florida
Medical Association, the Florida Society of Internal Medicine,
the Florida Society of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, the
Florida Osteopathic Medical Association, the Florida Hospices,
Inc., and the Florida Nurses Association.359
Accordingly, the court held that the Florida statute banning
assisted suicide did not violate article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. 360 The court made clear that this holding did not
mean that a carefully crafted statute authorizing assisted suicide
would be unconstitutional, but pointed out that the Legislature,
and not the court, was the appropriate branch of government to
make this decision. 61
355. Id. (quoting Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162).
356. Id.
357. See id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997))
(citations omitted).
358. See id. at 103-04.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 104.
361. See id.
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Of the sixjustices who voted on the case, five concurred with
the majority. 6 2 Justice Kogan wrote a dissenting opinion expres-
sing his disagreement. In his dissent, Justice Kogan explained
that the notion of "dying of natural causes" and the traditional
concept of suicide are no longer readily distinguishable from
one another: "Medicine now has pulled the aperture separating
life and death far enough apart to expose a limbo unthinkable
fifty years ago, for which the law has no easy description." '6 3 Jus-
tice Kogan argued that Florida's right of privacy should protect a
patient's right to die:
To my mind, the right of privacy attaches with unusual
force at the death bed. This conclusion arises in part from
the privacy our society traditionally has afforded the death
bed, but also from the very core of the right of privacy-
the right of self-determination even in the face of
majoritarian disapproval. What possible interest does soci-
ety have in saving life when there is nothing of life to save
but a final convulsion of agony? The state has no business
in this arena. Terminal illness is not a portrait in blacks
and whites, but unending shades of gray, involving the
most profound of personal, moral, and religious questions.
Many people can and do disagree over these questions, but
the fact remains that it is the dying person who must
resolve them in the particular case. And while we certainly
cannot ignore the slippery-slope problem, we previously
have established fully adequate standards to police the
exercise of privacy rights in this context to ensure against
abuse.
3 64
Finally, Justice Kogan concluded that the state's interest in
preserving the life of a terminally ill patient failed to meet the
compelling state interest test:
I cannot in good conscience say that the state's interest is
compelling, given the fact that Mr. Hall's life no longer
can be saved. Here, the state is vouchsafing nothing but
indignity and suffering-hardly "compelling" interests. I
further believe that the rule established by the majority is
not merely unworkable but rests on concerns of an era
that, however much we may regret it, no longer exists. A
sharp dividing line once separated life from death. Today
there stretches a chasm of ambiguities. Because the con-
frontation of these ambiguities is inherently a personal
362. Justice Anstead was recused from the case.
363. Id. at 109 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 111 (citation omitted).
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decision, I am unwilling to remove from Mr. Hall's control
the way in which he confronts his own personal fate.
365
At the end of the day, however, the majority of the court was
unwilling to recognize a patient's right to die in Florida's Consti-
tution. Thus, although Floridians enjoy greater privacy protec-
tion in some areas, this protection does not cover the right to
assisted suicide. The inherent problems with recognizing this
right, such as the uncertainty in how it might be applied and the
obvious potential for abuse, were unavoidable stumbling blocks
for a majority of the court. The Florida Supreme Court was hesi-
tant to extend the umbrella of privacy to cover assisted suicide,
choosing instead to rely on the legislature to recognize such a
right.
2. Right to Purchase Obscene Materials
Finally, consider the issue of an individual's right to obtain
obscene material. In the three decades since the regulation of
obscenity has come to occupy judicial minds, the Supreme Court
has reached a dead end on the map of First Amendment juris-
prudence. While obscenity law may be stagnant in the federal
courts, it is far from resolved. The Supreme Court has yet to
clearly define the appropriate reach of obscenity regulation, or
announce a cogent standard for such judicial determination.3 6 6
As Justice Brennan stated: "No other aspect of the First Amend-
ment has, in recent years, demanded so substantial a commit-
ment of our time, generated such a disharmony of views, and
remained so resistant to the formulation of stable and managea-
ble standards."
67
A brief overview of the history of obscenity law demonstrates
that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to uncover new ter-
rain by applying a constitutional privacy analysis to this area of
the law. Therefore, obscenity jurisprudence remains mired in
the First Amendment, which has resulted in limited protections
for individuals under federal law.
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States3 68 deter-
mined that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity.
Roth involved a conviction under federal law for sending obscene
material through the U.S. mail. Upholding the conviction, the
365. Id. at 115.
366. See Claudia Tuchman, Does Privacy Have Four Walls ? Salvaging Stanley
v. Georgia, 94 Colurn. L. Rev. 2267, 2267 (1994).
367. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
368. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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majority found that "it is apparent that the unconditional phras-
ing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance," 69 and observed that "implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance."37 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court announced the following bifurcated procedure for analyz-
ing obscenity regulation: If "the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, [finds] the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole [to] appeal [ ] to prurient interest,"
the material can be classified as obscene and regulated accord-
ingly. 71 However, if the material survives the test, it is not
deemed "obscene" and thus merits full First Amendment
protection.372
In the years following Roth, the Court modified the test for
determining what constitutes obscenity, and announced in Miller
v. California373 the test which is used today. In Miller, the Court
established a three-prong test that identified obscenity based on
whether the material (1) has a dominant theme that appeals to
the prurient interest in sex; (2) is patently offensive in affronting
community standards regarding the description of sexual mat-
ters, and (3) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value.
374
Over a decade after the Roth decision, in Stanley v. Georgia,375
the Court departed from Roth's blanket approach by introducing
into the analysis the right of privacy as an additional constitu-
tional consideration. Stanley involved a warrant search of Robert
Stanley's home for evidence of alleged bookmaking activities.
During the search, police officers discovered reels of film that
they determined to be obscene. Subsequently, Stanley was
arrested pursuant to a Georgia statute which prohibits the posses-
sion, sale, and distribution of obscene material.37 6
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall recognized that
both privacy and First Amendment principles were implicated.
Specifically, the Court considered the privacy aspects of individ-
ual thought and the sanctity of the home, and explained that:
Th[e] right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.
369. Id. at 483.
370. Id. at 484.
371. Id. at 489.
372. See id
373. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
374. See id. at 24.
375. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
376. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 26-630(1) (Supp. 1968).
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Moreover, in the context of this case-a prosecution for
mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy
of a person's home-that right takes on an added dimen-
sion. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in
very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy.
37 7
Thus, despite their authority to regulate certain forms of
public obscenity, states may not cross the threshold of the home
and attempt to control "the contents of. . . [one's] library."
3 7 8
The Stanley Court concluded that obscenity commands constitu-
tional protection under certain circumstances; therefore, a state
cannot constitutionally criminalize the private possession of
obscene material. 79
While the Court's opinion was a breakthrough in obscenity
law, Stanley's reach proved limited. In the post-Stanley era, the
Court has interpreted the privacy protection afforded in Stanley
as merely applying to the physical home, as opposed to individ-
ual thought processes, and has returned to a Roth/Miller obscen-
ity analysis for all instances of non-home-based possession.38 °
Additionally, in a move which has further minimized the holding
in Stanley, the Court has also created exceptions to the privacy-of-
the-home rationale for cases involving child pornography.
3 8 '
In light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to expand their
holding in Stanley, individuals have begun challenging obscenity
regulations under state law in an effort to legalize the sale and
distribution of obscene material based on the greater privacy
protections afforded by their state's constitution. The Florida
Supreme Court and the Hawaii Supreme Court are two courts
377. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
378. Id. at 565.
379. See id. at 566.
380. See United States v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 127 (1973) (dismissing all claims of a general right of privacy based on
the "explicitly narrow and precisely delineated privacy right on which Stanley
rests" and the "line of demarcation" that starts only at the threshold of the
home); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973) (holding that there
is no "zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that] follows such [obscene]
material when it is moved outside the home protected by Stanley); and Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (concluding that a state may con-
stitutionally regulate the public viewing of obscene films in a theater restricted
to paying adults); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (limiting
Stanley to the geographical locus of the home).
381. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (stating that the gov-
ernmental interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors is sufficiently compelling to permit regulating possession of child por-
nography in the home).
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that have addressed this issue, but as will be shown, the courts
reached differing conclusions.
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court examined the constitu-
tionality of section 847.011 of the Florida Statutes, Florida's
obscenity statute, in Stall v. State.38 2 In Stall, Stall and several
other persons were charged with violating the Florida Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act,3" 3 predicated
on forty-eight violations of Florida's obscenity statute. 384 The
complaint alleged that violations "occurred through the showing,
sale, distribution, and rental of allegedly obscene writings and
tapes, and objects allegedly intended for obscene purposes. "385
The trial court dismissed the state's pretrial motion and held
that the statute violated Florida's privacy amendment.386 On
appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Florida's right to
privacy provision does not shield individuals from criminal prose-
cution."' Petitioners appealed the district court ruling to the
Florida Supreme Court and argued that Florida's privacy amend-
ment should be interpreted to protect sellers and distributors of
obscene material because, without this interpretation, an individ-
ual's right to possess such material is meaningless.3 8  The
supreme court accepted the case pursuant to its discretionary
review powers.
Prior to addressing the constitutional challenges, Justice
McDonald, writing for the majority, implicitly acknowledged that
the Petitioners (the sellers of the obscene material) had standing
to bring this cause of action by citing to the district court's ruling
on this issue.
38 9
Next, the court began its analysis by recognizing previous
cases where it had found Florida's obscenity statute to be consti-
tutional. 39" The court noted specifically its previous decision in
382. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990).
383. FLA. STAT. § 895.01-.06 (1985).
384. See Stall, 570 So. 2d at 257.
385. Id. at 258.
386. See id.
387. See State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
388. See Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260.
389. See id. at 258. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Long, 544 So. 2d at 221-22 (holding
that the sellers have standing to bring claim since (1) § 847.011 (1) (a) prohibits
distribution of obscene materials; and (2) the customers, whose privacy rights
will be violated by the statute, are not subject to prosecution and will, therefore,
have no effective avenue of preserving their rights).
390. See Sardiello v. State, 394 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1981) (upholding obscen-
ity statute where defendants had been charged with possession of obscene
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State v. Kraham.91 In that case, Kraham was charged with selling
obscene motion pictures. The trial court dismissed the charges,
relying on Stanley v. Georgia,39 2 and found that "[a] regulation
that criminally punishes one for providing that citizen with mate-
rial he has a Constitutional right to possess is illogical and arbi-
trary." 93 As the Stall court noted, Kraham reversed the lower
court's ruling based on Johnson. 94
While the Stall court acknowledged that Stanley stands for
the proposition that an individual's private possession of obscene
material is protected, the court distinguished this interest from
the protection of those who deal commercially in obscenity.
395
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that states have a legitimate interest in deterring
the sale of obscene material.396 Moreover, as the Stall court
pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has specifically
refused to extend Stanley to the sale and distribution of obscene
material, finding that "the protected right to possess obscene
material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to a cor-
relative right to have someone sell or give it to others." '397
The Stall court recognized that Florida's privacy amendment
affords greater protection to its citizens than does the Federal
Constitution, and that this right encompasses the right to possess
obscene materials in the privacy of one's home. 98 Thus, the
court observed that an assessment of governmental intrusion into
an individual's privacy rights requires the application of the Win-
material with intent to sell); Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1977)
(upholding a conviction for selling obscene magazines).
391. 360 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1978).
392. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
393. Kraham, 360 So. 2d at 394.
394. While the Court appeared to find this case law persuasive, it must be
noted that with the exception of Sardiello, each of these cases were decided
prior to the enactment of Florida's privacy amendment, and were decided
exclusively on the grounds that the statute was not overbroad or vague. While
Sardiello was decided subsequent to the adoption of Florida's privacy amend-
ment, a right of privacy violation was not raised, and it too was decided on the
overbroad/vagueness issue.
395. See Stal 570 So. 2d at 259.
396. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 58 (1989).
397. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting United States v. Twelve 200-Foot
Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)). However, note that
some of the United States Supreme Court cases cited by the court can be distin-
guished. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (finding a compelling state
interest in the deterrence of child pornography, as the health and welfare of
children are at stake); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding based
partially upon the fact that defendant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexu-
ally explicit material).
398. See Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260.
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field/strict scrutiny standard3 99 if a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy exists.4"0 However, the Stall court found that a reasonable
expectation of privacy was not present in this case:
Although one may possess obscene material in one's
home, there is no legitimate reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in being able to patronize retail establishments for the
purpose of purchasing such material. Also, it does not appear
that the defense in the instant case presented private individuals
whose right to possess obscene materials at home had been violated
by the instant state action.40 1
In support of its conclusion, the court quoted the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton:
402
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included "only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' This privacy
right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of
the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing. Nothing, however, in this Court's deci-
sions intimates that there is any "fundamental" privacy
right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to watch
obscene movies in places of public accommodation.
Moreover, we have declined to equate the privacy of
the home relied on in Stanley with a "zone" of "privacy" that
follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials
wherever he goes. The idea of a "privacy" right and a place
of public accommodation are, in this context, mutually
exclusive.4 ° 3
Thus, the court found that "the right to possess privately
does not equate to the right to sell publicly."40 4 In reaching this
conclusion, the court adopted the lower courts reasoning:
399. See id. (citing Winfield v. Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla.
1985)).
400. See id. (citing Winfield).
401. Id. (emphasis added). The last sentence of this quote begs the ques-
tion: had a private individual's right to possess obscene materials been violated,
would the court's holding in this case have been different?
402. 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973).
403. Id. (citations omitted).
404. 570 So. 2d at 262. Note that the court uses the concepts of selling
and purchasing interchangeably. While these concepts are clearly interrelated,
the court's failure to differentiate the two is crucial to its final holding, as selling
denotes the rights of a vendor, who has no established privacy interest, while
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It is clear that Florida's right to privacy is broader than the
federal right. However, it is not so broad that a person can
take it with him to the store in order to purchase obscene
material-even though he has the right to possess such
material in the privacy of his home.
4 0 5
Having determined that no privacy interest existed, the
obscenity statute did not have to undergo an analysis under the
Winfield/strict scrutiny standard, but was merely required to be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Having deter-
mined that this lesser standard applied, the Stall court relied
upon the precedence of federal case law, where the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held that the state has a legiti-
mate state interest "in stemming the tide of commercial obscen-
ity. ''  Consequently, the court held that the privacy provision of
the Florida constitution does not apply to vendors of obscene
material; and therefore, the statute was not unconstitutional.40 7
Thus, in the area of obscenity regulation, Florida citizens do not
enjoy greater privacy protections under Florida's constitution
than they do under the Federal Constitution.
This poses the question of whether other states provide
greater privacy protections in the area of obscenity regulation.
Because the Hawaii Constitution also contains an explicit privacy
right clause, State v. Kam4 will provide a helpful comparison
between Florida and other states that have similar privacy
provisions.
In reaching its conclusion, the Stall court acknowledged that
the Hawaii Supreme Court in Kam had addressed the same issue
and found that Hawaii's explicit privacy provision does protect a
seller's right to distribute pornographic material. However, the
Stall court disagreed with the Hawaii court's rationalization that
because Eisenstadt v. Baird4 ° 9 allowed a vendor to raise a pur-
chaser's Fourteenth Amendment claim, a vendor of obscene
material can claim and have the same rights as a private citizen
enjoys.4 10 An analysis of the Kam decision will demonstrate that
while that court did rely upon the Eisenstadt decision, it was not
for the proposition stated by the Stall court.
purchasing denotes the rights of a buyer, who has an undisputed right to possess.
See State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372 (Haw. 1988).
405. Stall 570 So. 2d at 262 (quoting State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219, 223
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
406. Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
407. See id. at 263.
408. 748 P.2d 372 (Haw. 1988).
409. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410. See Stall 570 So. 2d at 262.
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In Kam, the Hawaii Supreme Court considered whether
Hawaii's pornography statute,4 1 1 violated the state constitution's
right to privacy clause.41 2 In Kam, two bookstore clerks were
arrested for selling adult magazines to undercover policemen.
The issues presented to the Hawaii Supreme Court were: (1)
whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and/or
vague; (2) whether the clerks possess the standing to assert the
privacy rights of their customers to purchase sexually explicit
adult materials; and (3) whether the statute infringes on the
right of privacy.
On the first issue, the court ruled that since the statute's def-
inition of obscenity followed the requirements of Miller v. Califor-
nia,4 1 it was therefore not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague.
4 14
As to the second issue, the court pointed out that prior to
addressing the merits of the right to privacy violation claim, it
was first necessary to determine whether the clerks, as sellers of
pornographic material, "possess the standing to assert the privacy
rights of those persons who wish to buy those items to read or view in the
privacy of the home."4 5 This analysis is the key distinction between
the Kam and Stall decisions. While the decision in Stall rested on
whether sellers hold a fundamental privacy right to sell porno-
graphic material,4 16 the Kam court focused the question on the
buyer's right to purchase those items, which he or she has a con-
stitutional right to possess. In deciding this issue, the Hawaii
411. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 712-1214 (1999) (providing in part: "(1) A
person commits the offense of promoting pornography if, knowing its content
and character, the person: (a) Disseminates for monetary consideration any
pornographic material ....").
412. See HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.").
413. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
414. See Kam, 748 P.2d at 375.
415. Id.
416. There is some uncertainty with the actual focus of the Stall opinion.
While the court clearly stated that it did not need to "determine whether the
obscenity statute embodies a compelling state interest because the privacy
amendment does not apply to vendors of obscene material," Stall, 570 So. 2d at
260 (emphasis added), it went on to state that "there is no legitimate reason-
able expectation of privacy in being able to patronize retail establishments for the
purpose of purchasing [obscene] material." Id. (emphasis added). However,
the court went on to state that "it does not appear that the defense . ..
presented private individuals whose right to possess obscene materials at home had
been violated by the instant state action." Id. (emphasis added). This state-
ment begs the question-had those individuals been presented, would the
court's holding have been different?
2000]
1006 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Eisenstadt, and this was crucial to the court's ultimate holding.
In Eisenstadt, the United States Supreme Court found that a
distributor of contraceptives had standing to assert the rights of
unmarried persons who had been denied access to contracep-
tives."' Based on Eisenstadt, the Hawaii Supreme Court con-
cluded that Appellants did in fact have "standing to assert the
constitutional privacy rights of the buyers of pornographic mate-
rial." '418 As the court pointed out, enforcing the statute "against
the sellers of pornography severely reduces the ability of persons
to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of the
home," and since the persons seeking to buy pornographic mate-
rial were not subject to prosecution under the law, they would
have no forum to challenge the law.419
As noted above, Stall determined that sellers of obscene mate-
rial do not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in selling
obscene material; therefore, Florida's statute did not have to sur-
vive the scrutiny of the compelling state interest test.4 20 In con-
trast, the Kam court concluded that it was the buyer's rights that
were at issue. Since there was no question that buyers do have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in being able to possess obscene
material, the Kam court concluded that the compelling state
interest standard was appropriate.421
Having established Appellants' standing, the Kam court
addressed the fundamental issue: "Is an individual's fundamental
privacy right to own and view pornographic material violated
when he or she is effectively denied the right to obtain such
material (since generally, pornography is bought for private use
at home)? ' 422 The court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the right to possess
obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise
to a right to sell or give it to others.4 23 However, the court
observed that this view has spawned considerable controversy
417. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
418. Kam, 748 P.2d at 376.
419. Id. (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446).
420. It is interesting to note that while the Stall court did not expound on
the standing issue in the opinion, the court did cite to the district court's analy-
sis of this issue (in State v. Long) when it implicitly found that the Appellants
(sellers) did have standing, and this analysis is very similar to that found in the
Kam opinion.
421. See Kam, 748 P.2d at 380.
422. Id. at 376.
423. See id. See also United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,
413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1973) (hold-
ing that Congress has authority to regulate the commerce of obscene material
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and numerous dissents, and endorsed Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion in Pope v. Illinois4 24 by concluding that since the govern-
ment cannot constitutionally criminalize the possession or sale of
obscene literature, without some connection to minors or blatant
exposure to unconsenting adults, the government cannot prose-
cute the sellers of pornography:
425
The [United States Supreme] Court has adopted a restric-
tive reading of Stanley, opining that it has no implications
to the criminalization of the sale or distribution of obscen-
ity. But such a crabbed approach offends the overarching
First Amendment principles discussed in Stanley, almost as
much as it insults the citizenry by declaring its right to read
and possess material which it may not legally obtain. In
Stanley, the Court recognized that there are legitimate rea-
sons for the state to regulate obscenity: protecting children
and protecting the sensibilities of unwilling viewers. But
surely a broad criminal prohibition on all sale of obscene
material cannot survive simply because the state may con-
stitutionally restrict public display or prohibit sale of the
material to minors.
4 26
The Kam court next explained that since article I, section 6
of the Hawaii Constitution affords greater privacy rights than
does the Federal Constitution, the court was not bound by the
United States Supreme Court precedents. 427 The court observed
that the Hawaii privacy amendment specifically requires "that it
can be infringed upon only by the showing of a compelling state
interest," and only through the use of the least restrictive
means.4 2' Relying on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Carey v. Population Services International,4 29 the court con-
cluded that because the enforcement of Hawaii's pornography
statute had a detrimental impact on an individual's privacy right
based on the risk of ultimate exposure to juveniles or to the general public);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
424. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
425. See Kam, 748 P.2d 377 (citing Pope, 481 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting, joined by Marshall, J., and Brennan, J., in part)).
426. Id. (quoting Pope, 481 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
and footnote omitted).
427. See id.
428. Id. at 378.
429. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a state law which restricted the sale
of contraceptives to licensed pharmacists and impermissibly infringed on an
individual's privacy right to decide about family planning by making contracep-
tives less accessible to the public).
2000]
1008 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
to possess such material, without a showing of a compelling gov-




The court stated that while the State supported its argument
that there was a legitimate state interest in regulating the com-
merce of obscene material, the decisions relied upon by the State
were distinguishable because they used the "rational basis" stan-
dard.'3 1 Therefore, the court concluded: "Since a person has the
right to view pornographic items at home, there necessarily fol-
lows a correlative right to purchase such materials for this per-
sonal use, or the underlying privacy right becomes
meaningless.
43 2
Consequently, in this instance, Florida citizens have less pri-
vacy protections than do the citizens of Hawaii, even though both
states have express privacy provisions. The distinction appears to
be in the focus of the two state supreme court decisions. While
Kam considered the statute's infringement on an individual's
clear right to possess pornographic material, Stall focused on
whether a seller has a right to distribute such material, and was
unwilling to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in this
activity.
CONCLUSION
After examining the manner in which the Florida Supreme
Court has handled these issues as compared to courts from other
jurisdictions, one can see a possible trend in the outcomes of the
Florida cases. Of course, the makeup of the Florida Supreme
Court is always changing, and thus no one can predict how the
court might decide certain issues in the future. However, it
would at least appear that prior decisions have allowed the state
right of privacy to prevail where the conduct has not been crimi-
nally proscribed. In contrast, the court has given less considera-
tion to awarding a state right of privacy where the conduct has
been criminally sanctioned. For example, pursuant to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe, it is undisputed
that obtaining an abortion is not criminally prohibited. 3 In
430. See Kam, 748 P.2d at 380.
431. See id. at 379.
432. Id. at 380.
433. While FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4) (a) (10) (1988) imposed criminal sanc-
tions for violations of that statute, based on Florida's common law it appears
that only the doctor performing an abortion in violation of that provision
would be charged, and not the minor receiving the abortion. Therefore, the
conduct of the minor, whose right of privacy is at issue, would not be criminally
prohibited. See State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the
state could not prosecute a teenage woman who shot herself in the abdomen
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contrast, the act of selling or purchasing pornographic material
is clearly criminally sanctioned.434
In conclusion, this article demonstrates that Floridians have
been afforded more privacy protection than citizens in states
where no explicit right of privacy exists. At least in some
instances, article I, section 23 has proven to be the deciding fac-
tor in curbing unreasonable state interference into Florida citi-
zens' day-to-day lives.
during third trimester of pregnancy causing death of fetus since at common
law, while a third party can be held criminally liable for causing injury or death
of fetus, a pregnant woman can not be).
434. Moreover, the Stall court appeared to suggest that had evidence
been presented that the statute infringed upon an individual's right to possess
pornographic material, the holding in that may case may have been different.
See Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990).
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